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Abstract
We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private
value auctions, including the ¯rst general existence result for double auctions. The set
of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit
demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand
and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double
auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of
trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for
discontinuous Bayesian games.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are generally modeled by allowing players to choose from continuum bidding spaces.
However, players' payo®s in auctions are discontinuous at points of tied bids; which in the
face of continuum bidding spaces makes existence of equilibrium di±cult to prove. Much of
what is known about existence of equilibrium in auctions comes from exhibiting equilibrium
strategies in symmetric settings (for instance in Milgrom and Weber [22]) or relying on
monotonicity arguments (e.g., Athey [1] or Maskin and Riley [21]). This leaves open the
question of existence of equilibria in many auction settings, such as those where distributions
fail to satisfy nice monotonicity properties, and settings including the important class of
double auctions.
Since the fundamental di±culty in these proofs revolves around the continuity of the bid
space, one might well ask why one bothers to impose such an assumption. After all, one
could argue that all true bid spaces are in fact discrete. However, continuum bid spaces are
a very useful approximation as they simplify the analysis; allowing, for example, one to use
calculus to characterize equilibria. Thus, almost all models of auctions use continuum bid
spaces and so it is important to understand when equilibria exist in such models. Moreover,
discrete bid spaces can introduce some pathological equilibria. For example, both Jackson [9]
and Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame ([10], henceforth JSSZ) show examples where the
game with ¯nite bid spaces has an equilibrium, while the continuum game does not. In each,
one positive measure set of player types concentrates on one bid, while another concentrates
on the next available bid. This does not strike us as what we had in mind when discussing
equilibrium. Existence of equilibrium with continuum bidding spaces helps to establish the
existence of a non-pathological equilibrium in the discrete versions of these auctions.1;2
This paper has three main results about equilibria in auctions: Existence, Invariance,
and Non-Triviality. By existence, of course we mean that the set of equilibria is non-empty.
By Invariance, we mean that the set of equilibria of auctions in our class does not depend
on the precise tie-breaking rule. Invariance actually plays a key role in our existence proof.
And, by non-triviality, we mean that in the set of equilibria there is always one in which
1JSSZ also argue that one should be uncomfortable with the equilibria of discrete bid auctions if one
does not know that they correspond to analogs in the continuum, because absent an existence result for the
continuum case, there is no assurance that the equilibrium does not depend on the particular discretization
chosen. For example, it might be critical whether di®erent player's available bids overlap or are disjoint.
2The underlying existence theorems used (either JSSZ or Reny), include an upper hemi-continuity result.
Hence, the fact (which we establish) that all equilibria of the continuum game are tie-free implies the existence
of almost tie-free equilibria in games with small bid increments.
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trade occurs with positive probability.
Our existence and invariance results apply to auctions that can be single or double sided,
including settings where players are unsure at the time that they bid whether they will be net
buyers or net sellers. The pricing rule can be quite general, including both the uniform and
discriminatory cases, all pay features, entry costs, reserve prices, and many other variations.
Demands and supplies may be for multiple units, and valuations can be asymmetrically
distributed and follow very general correlation patterns; neither independence nor any form
of a±liation is assumed. Finally, in addition to covering standard tie-breaking rules we also
cover more general tie-breaking rules, including allowing the auctioneer to use information in
breaking ties that he is typically not assumed to have, such as the true values of the players.
In double auctions, showing that an equilibrium exists does not close the issue. The
di±culty is that double auctions have a degenerate equilibrium in which all buyers bid
0, and all sellers bid ¹v; the upper bound of values.3 Our second main result establishes
existence of a non-degenerate equilibrium for each auction in our class; that is, one where
trade occurs with positive probability. So, our results are not vacuous in settings where
there exist degenerate no-trade equilibria. Taken together, these two results provide the ¯rst
general existence result of any form for the double auction setting.4
Our results, and the relation between invariance and existence can be understood as
follows.
First, let us discuss invariance. Let an omniscient tie-breaking rule be a map from bids
and values to distributions over allocations that respects the order of bids. Such maps
include standard tie-breaking rules where ties are broken by some simple randomization or
¯xed priorities, but also include weirder rules, such as ones where the auctioneer uses other
information such as players' types and, for instance, breaks ties e±ciently. Say that a tie-
breaking rule is trade-maximizing if ties between buyers and sellers are broken in favor of
buyers. Then, the invariance result states that if a strategy pro¯le forms an equilibrium for
one omniscient tie-breaking rule, it remains an equilibrium for any other trade-maximizing
omniscient tie-breaking rule. Two ideas underlie this result. First, regardless of the tie-
breaking rule, given the continuous distribution over types players will not want to play
3Such no-trade equilibria are notoriously di±cult to overcome in some other settings. For instance, see
the discussion of positive trade equilibria in market games in Dubey and Shubik [7] and Peck, Shell, and
Spear [24].
4Williams [36] shows existence in the particular case that the price is determined by the lowest winning
buy bid. This case is easier, because (a) the sellers then have as a weakly dominant strategy to bid their
values and hence (b) the game can be thought of as a one sided auction with a hidden reserve price schedule,
for which degenerate equilibria are not an issue.
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in such way as to be involved in ties with positive probability (except that a buyer and a
seller may be tied provided trade occurs between them), as otherwise some player should
bene¯t from raising or lowering his bids contingent on some types. So, changing to some
other trade-maximizing tie- breaking rule does not change payo®s under the original strategy
pro l¯e. Second, if a player has an improving deviation relative to some strategy pro l¯e and
tie-breaking rule, then there is a slight modi¯cation of the deviation that is still improving
and also avoid ties. But then, any improving deviation at one tie-breaking rule implies
an improving deviation under any other tie-breaking rule as well. Hence, replacing one tie-
breaking rule with another does not change the best replies of the players at the equilibrium.5
With the invariance result in hand, there are at least three ways to complete the proof
of existence. First, one can use the main result of JSSZ. They prove existence of equilibria
in Bayesian games in which tie-breaking is allowed to be \endogenous" in the sense that it
is determined as part of the equilibrium and can depend (in an incentive compatible way)
on the private information of players. A fortiori this is an equilibrium with omniscient tie-
breaking, and hence, by the invariance result the strategies involved are also an equilibrium
for any trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule including any standard one.
The invariance result can also be used to establish existence via the theorem of Reny
[26] (henceforth Reny). We know of two such approaches. In one approach, one uses an
auxiliary result of Reny's (Proposition 3.2), involving a condition called reciprocal upper
semicontinuity (due to Simon [30], who generalizes Dasgupta and Maskin [6]). This requires
that if one player's payo® jumps down at a discontinuity, some other player's payo® jumps
up. Under standard tie-breaking, this condition is not satis¯ed (see footnote 13 of Reny).
However, if tie-breaking is chosen to maximize the sum of player payo®s, then reciprocal
upper semicontinuity is satis¯ed (as is the stronger condition of Dasgupta andMaskin). Since
such tie-breaking is among the omniscient tie-breaking rules, this (coupled with invariance)
again implies the result.
We use a di®erent approach in applying Reny's result, working directly with his main
theorem. We think this approach illustrates an important way of applying Reny's result
more generally, and that it hints at a deeper connection between Reny and JSSZ. Reny's
basic condition, better-reply-security, requires checking that there are paying deviations not
just relative to payo®s actually available at non-Nash strategy pro¯les, but also relative to
all payo®s that can be generated as a limit of near-by strategy pro¯les. The deviation must
pay not only relative to the original strategy pro l¯e, but to small perturbations. The ¯rst
part of applying Reny thus involves the potentially daunting task of characterizing the set
5An important precursor to this idea of substitution of tie-breaking rules can be found in Lebrun [17].
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of payo® pro¯les available from such limits at any given point, which in particular can be
quite complicated at points of discontinuity such as ties. We show, however, that any such
payo® pro l¯e can be induced by an appropriately chosen omniscient tie-breaking rule. Then,
using the ¯rst idea underlying our invariance result, that players will play so as to avoid
being involved in ties regardless of the tie-breaking rule, establishes the desired condition.
We ¯nd it illuminating that all three routes to existence rely on some form of omniscient
tie-breaking.6
The last piece of the puzzle is to show that there are non-degenerate (positive trade)
equilibria in settings such as the double auction. Our approach is to \seed" the auction with
a non-strategic player who is present with small probability, and who then makes buy or sell
bids uniform over the range of values. With this extra player present, it no longer makes
sense for buyers to always o®er 0, or sellers to always ask ¹v; since such bids never trade,
while one could bid more generously, and sometimes pro¯tably trade with the non-strategic
player. What is less clear is that this implies an amount of trade that does not vanish as
the probability of the non-strategic player being present goes to 0. The key is to show that
once the non-strategic player is present, competition to trade with him will push the bids
of buyers with high values well above 0 and sellers with low values well below ¹v: Essentially
then, the extra player sets o® a cascade, resulting in a positive amount of trade even as the
probability that the extra player is present vanishes.
Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents our private-value auction setting.
Section 4.1 shows that the set of equilibria in such auctions are invariant to the tie-breaking
rule. In Section 4.2, we show how invariance implies existence of equilibria for the auctions in
our class. Section 5 shows that these equilibria can be chosen to have non-degenerate trade
in auction environments where no-trade equilibria are a possibility, such as double auctions.
An appendix contains the proofs.
2 Related Literature
The method of proof we use for our ¯rst result, of demonstrating existence with an non-
standard tie-breaking rule and then showing that the tie-breaking can be changed to a
standard one, is reminiscent of Maskin and Riley [21].7 The strategy of Maskin and Riley's
6This is also true of Lebrun [17] and Maskin and Riley [21].
7This technique is also used by JSSZ who argue that if valuations are private and the distribution is
atomless and satis¯es some other continuity conditions, then there exists an equilibrium in a ¯rst-price
auction with standard tie-breaking (see their Example 3).
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proof is to consider a sequence of auctions with ¯nite bid spaces, in which, in the event of
a tie, a Vickrey auction takes place. For the auctions they consider, the Vickrey auction is
enough to guarantee that payo®s are preserved in the limit as the ¯nite grid of bids grows
¯ne. They then argue that these ties would never occur in equilibrium anyway, and so the
equilibrium is in fact a standard one. So, like them, we show existence in a game where
one does something strange in the event of a tie and then work backward to show that in
many cases of interest this was irrelevant, in our case, by applying our invariance result.
Within the class of private value auctions, we cover a substantially broader set of cases than
those of Maskin and Riley, essentially because our tie-breaking methods allow for potentially
stranger rules. This allows us to handle equilibrium where bidding is not monotone in type,
and thus to cover a wide variety of auction formats and information structures not handled
in the previous literature. On the other hand, Maskin and Riley's results hold for some
non-private value auctions (with a±liated types) while our result does not. It is an open
question how far techniques like those in this paper extend beyond private value auctions.
As discussed above, the idea of getting existence in games with augmented message spaces
is also related to Lebrun [17], who looks at ¯rst price single unit private value auctions in
which bids are augmented by messages which turn out to be irrelevant. He notes that in
augmenting the game, and letting tie-breaking depend on the message sent, he is doing
something reminiscent of what Simon and Zame [31] do in games of complete information.8
Thus, in the speci¯c setting he studies, Lebrun's technique parallels the one we use here.
This paper is also related to the literature on existence in games with continuum type
spaces, including, for example, Dasgupta and Maskin [6], Simon [30], and of course Reny
[26]. Reny shows that his condition applies in a multiple unit, private value, pay your bids
auction, a case for which we also prove existence (see his Example 5.2). A recent working
paper by Bresky [3] uses a di®erent line of attack to apply Reny's result to private value
auctions. Neither paper covers the class of settings covered here.
Of course, none of the previous literature has anything to say about the problem of
no-trade equilibria in double auctions.
Thus we move beyond the previous literature in four ways:
1. We show a broad invariance property across tie-breaking rules for the equilibria of
private value auctions.
2. We show that the invariance property and consideration of non-standard tie-breaking
8The idea of using messages to restore limit continuity in a ¯nite approximation setting should also be
credited to Manelli [20], who uses such messages to restore equilibria in in¯nite signaling games.
5
allows for the straightforward application of either JSSZ or Reny. The way in which
these results can be leveraged should be interesting in its own right and potentially of
wider applicability.
3. This provides an existence result for private value auctions that covers substantially
more ground than previous results, even in the single auction case.
4. Finally, we show there always exists an equilibrium in which there is a positive prob-
ability of trade. This overcomes the problem of no-trade equilibria, and provides the
¯rst existence result of any form for double auctions.9
A number of papers approach the existence question in single unit auctions by examining
the associated set of di®erential equations. A strength of this approach as compared to ours
is that it allows for interesting comparative static and uniqueness results. Such an approach
requires much more structure regarding the distributions of valuations than we require here.
For some leading examples, see Milgrom and Weber [22], Lebrun [18], Bajari [2], and Lizzeri
and Persico [16].
Athey [1] considers conditions on games such that a monotone comparative statics result
applies to the best bid of a player as his signal varies. Essentially, one imposes a condition
under which, if all of i's opponents are using an increasing strategy, i has a best response
in increasing strategies. A strength of Athey's result is that it does not rest on private
values. It does however, require a single dimensional type space with something akin to the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP, see Example 1). Recent work by McAdams [19]
and Kazumori [14] extends this to a multiple dimensional setting with independent types,
in the former case with a discrete bid space, while in the later, with a continuum.
Each of the auction papers mentioned above derives the existence of pure strategy equi-
libria, while in general we show only the existence of equilibria in distributional strategies.
This is partly due to the methods we employ, but mostly due to the broadness of the class
of distributions of valuations that we admit. In particular (see Example 2 below) not all
auctions in our setting have such pure strategy equilibria, and so a result covering these
auctions can at most claim existence of mixed strategy equilibria. In some settings with
9Since the ¯rst writing of this paper (1999), others have also looked at existence of equilibrium in double
auctions. Fudenberg, Mobius, and Szeidl [8] show existence of equilibrium in double auctions with su±ciently
many players. Perry and Reny [25] address existence in double auctions with a discrete bid space. These
papers all work in a symmetric a±liated or conditionally independent setting, and derive increasing equilibria.
Our setting has neither symmetry nor a±liation, but does not rule out that the equilibria found involve
mixing.
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positively related valuations, one can start from our existence result and then independently
deduce that all equilibria must be in increasing (and therefore essentially pure) strategies.
We present one such result, generalizing McAdams and Kazumori for the case of private
values.10 See Reny and Zamir [27] and Krishna [15] for other interesting recent work on pure
strategy equilibria.
3 The Setting and a Class of Auctions
We begin by presenting our model of private value auctions. The model treats single and
double auctions (as well as hybrids) in a single framework.
3.1 The Setting
Let us ¯rst describe the setting in terms of the players, objects, valuations, and uncertainty.
Players
There are players N = f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ng, along with a non-strategic \player" 0, who can act as
the seller, for example, in a single sided auction.
Objects and Endowments
There is ` < 1 such that each player i 2 N [f0g has an endowment of ei 2 f0; 1; : : : ; `g
indivisible objects. Objects are identical. Let e = (e0; e1; : : : ; en) denote the vector of
endowments.
Valuations
Each player i 2 N desires at most ` objects. Player i's valuations are represented by
vi = (vi1; : : : ; vi`). The interpretation is that i has marginal value vih for an hth object.
Assumption 1: (Private Values) Player i receives value
PH
h=1 vih from having H objects.
For h · ei; we say that vih is a sell value. For h > ei, we say that vih is a buy value.
Let v = (v1; : : : ; vn) be the vector of valuations of the players.
Types
10With independent types, these papers can deal with interdependent values, which we do not. We would
like to be clear that while our basic existence results for equilibria in distributional strategies (including
non-trivial equilibria in double auctions) predate McAdams and Kazumori's, our corollary on pure strategy
equilibria postdates theirs, and, indeed is partly motivated by their work.
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We say that µi = (ei; vi) is the type of player i, and let µ = (e; v) denote the vector of
types of all players. Let £i ½ f0; 1; : : : ; `g £ IR` be the space of possible types for player i.11
Let £ = £0 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ £n be the space of type vectors.
Assumption 2: (Compact Type Space) £ is compact.
Let ¹v be such that £ ½ f0; 1; : : : ; `gn+1 £ [¡¹v; ¹v](n+1)`.
Uncertainty
The vector µ 2 £ is drawn according to a (Borel) probability measure P on £. The
marginal of P on µi is denoted Pi; i 2 f0; : : : ; ng. Without loss of generality, take £i to be
the support of Pi.
Assumption 3: (Imperfect Correlation) P is absolutely continuous with respect to
Qn
i=0 Pi;
with continuous Radon-Nikodym derivative f.
A3 puts no restriction on how ei and vi are related, or on the relationship between any
two values vih and vih0 for any given player. It simply imposes that (ei; vi) and (ej; vj) are
not too dependent. For instance, in a two-player, one-object auction, if P were uniform on
the diagonal fv j v11 = v21g ; then v1 and v2 would be perfectly correlated and P would not
be absolutely continuous with respect to P1 £ P2 (the uniform distribution on [0; 1]2). On
the other hand, under A3 types can be \almost perfectly correlated" in the sense that P can
place probability one on some small neighborhood of the diagonal.
Assumption 4: (Atomless Distributions) Pi (fvih = xg) = 0 for all i 2 N , h 2 f1; : : : ; `g,
and x 2 [¡¹v; ¹v]:
This assumption rules out that particular values occur with positive probability. It is
stronger than just assuming that Pi is atomless as it rules out, for example, that vi1 ´ 1
while vi2 is distributed uniformly on [0; 1]. It allows, however, vih = vih0 with probability
one.
We emphasize that we have not imposed any sort of a±liation among di®erent players'
values and so the following example is within our setting. Because this auction does not
have an equilibrium in non-decreasing strategies, it is not covered by any previous paper on
existence in auctions.
11We will generally ignore the valuations of the non-strategic \0" player.
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Example 1 Consider a two-player, private-value, ¯rst-price auction. Values are uniformly
distributed over the triangle
f(v1; v2)jv1 ¸ 0; v2 ¸ 0; 1 ¸ v1 + v2g :
Here, higher values of v1 correspond to lower expectations of v2, and vice versa. This auction
has no non-decreasing pure strategy Nash equilibrium. To see why not, suppose to the contrary
that such an equilibrium b1(¢); b2(¢) exists. Let us ¯rst argue that v2 ¸ b2(v2) for all v2 2 [0; 1).
Suppose not, so that b2(v02) > v02 for some v 02 2 [0; 1). Then, since b2 is non-decreasing,
b2(v2) > v2 for all v2 2 (v 02; b2(v02)) : But, then, since P (v jv1 < v2; v2 2 (v02; b2(v02))) > 0;
it must be that there is a positive probability that at least one of the players wins with a
bid above value,12 and so would do strictly better to lower his bid to value. This contradicts
equilibrium. Now consider a bid by bidder i when his value is above 1 ¡ ". He knows that
the other bidder's value is below ", and thus so are the other bidder's bids. Thus, i's bids
should be no more than ", and so i's bids for values near 1 are near 0. Therefore, the only
possible equilibrium in non-decreasing strategies is b1(v1) = b2(v2) = 0 for all (v1; v2); which
is clearly not an equilibrium.
Assumption 5: (Non-Increasing Marginal Valuations)
P (f(e; v)jvih ¸ vi;h+18i; hg) = 1:
A5 simply states that each player's marginal valuations for objects are non-increasing in
the number of objects. This makes our life easier in terms of keeping track of incentives. In
particular, with increasing marginal valuations, a player might ¯nd himself submitting the
same ¯rst and second bids, and simultaneously wishing he could lower his ¯rst bid because
he dislikes winning one object, but raise his second bid because he likes winning two objects.
A related and fuller discussion follows Assumption 9. Whether equilibria still exist in such
situations is an open question.
3.2 The Class of Auctions
We consider auctions where each player submits a vector of bids, one for each potential
object that they may buy or sell. Of course, the auction mechanism may ignore some of this
information, but we allow for the possibility that it is used.
12Either player 2 wins for at least some values of v2 2 (v02; b2(v02)) or else player 1 must be outbidding 2
even when v1 is lower than v2.
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Bidding and Reserve Prices
For each i 2 f0; : : : ; ng, a bid bi 2 IR` is a non-increasing vector of ` numbers. We assume
that there exist real numbers b < ¹b such that the set of allowable bid vectors for i is
Bi = [b; b]`:
Let B denote the set of admissible bid vectors, B = B0 £B1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ Bn.
The requirement that bid vectors be non-increasing is simply a labeling statement, as
bids can always be re-ordered in this manner. It will be consistent with how auctions process
bids, in the sense that higher bids are given priority.
For most sensible auctions, the spaces Bi include the compact support of the vi's and
bids outside of that range are weakly dominated. For example, in discriminatory as well as
uniform price auctions, a bid bih above vih is weakly dominated by a bid at vih. In an all
pay auction, a bid above vih is weakly dominated by bidding 0. In these settings, one is
making no extra restriction on bidder's behavior in imposing the existence of b.13 In settings
where there is a highest sensible bid for a buyer, allowing sell bids above that amount is a
convenient way to let a seller \sit out" of the auction, and similarly when there is a lowest
sensible bid for sellers.
Timing
The non-strategic player moves ¯rst, and the remaining players then move simultaneously.
So, at time 0, b0 is announced, then at time 1 each player i 2 N observes µi and submits a
bid bi.14;15;16
13For an example in which optimal buy bids may not be bounded from above, consider a third price
auction with three players. Suppose that player 3 happens to always bid between 0 and 1, and that player 1
and 2 have values that are always at least 2. Then, each of player 1 and player 2 would like any bid he makes
to always exceed any bid by the other player. So, optimal bids (at least in some scenarios) are unbounded.
For an example in which optimal buy bids may not be bounded from below, consider an auction in which
players each demand two units, and in which k units are for sale. The price is a convex combination of the
k and k + 1st highest bids, with the weight on the k-th being a strictly increasing function of the average
bid. Then, a bidder with a low second value might well ¯nd it optimal to submit a ¯rst bid near his ¯rst
value, but make his second bid arbitrarily negative.
14While treated identically to other bid vector's, b0 can be thought of as 0's reserve price vector. In order
to have player 0 not participate in the auction at all (for instance in a double auction) we can simply set
e0 = 0 and b0h = b for all h, in which case all of 0's bids are non-competitive.
15Secret reserve prices are handled by having player 1 have the only positive endowment, so that player 1
is the seller and his bid is the secret reserve.
16Note that we are considering the game having ¯xed b0, and not the game in which b0 is chosen strategi-
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Payments
The payment that a player makes or receives depends on the number of objects bought or
sold. We require that conditional on the number of units that i is allocated, and conditional
on the endowment vector, his payment varies continuously as a function of the vector of
submitted bids. Thus, there are continuous functions ti : f0; : : : ; `gn+2 £ B ! IR; such that
i's payment is ti(h; e; b) in the case where the bid pro¯le is b; the endowment vector is e, and
he receives h objects.17
Note that the assumption of continuity here is consistent with the discontinuities present
in an auction setting. This is because ti(h; e; b) only says what i would pay if i were to
receive h objects. A change in bids can still change how many objects i gets, say from h to
h+1, and thus can still lead to a discontinuous change in payments. For example, in a ¯rst
price auction, ti(1; 0; b) = bi and ti(0; 0; b) = 0; both of which are clearly continuous even
though the payment as a function of bids accounting for ties and changes in the number of
objects received is not continuous.
Typically (but not always, as illustrated by Example (4) below), ti(h; e; b) will have the
same sign as i's net trade, h ¡ ei.18
Payoffs
Players evaluate the outcome of the auction via von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions. This allows for risk-averse, risk-loving, or any of a variety of other sorts of preferences.
Assumption 6: (Expected Utility) Player i 2 N has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function Ui over her net payo®. Ui is continuous, strictly increasing and has a ¯rst derivative
that is bounded away from 0 and 1.
cally. It follows from Theorem 2 of JSSZ that the set of equilibria of the game de¯ned by b0 with omniscient
tie-breaking is upper hemi-continuous in b0: By Theorem 4 below, every such equilibrium is an equilibrium
under standard tie-breaking. Hence, the set of Nash equilibria of the game induced by b0 is upper hemi-
continuous. It follows that there is also an equilibrium of the game in which buyer 0 chooses b0 according to
some objective.
17The way in which we have de¯ned t includes a speci¯ cation of payments for b and h where in fact it is
not consistent for i to receive h objects given b. This is a notational convenience.
18An important point about the way in which we have formulated the payment rule is that player i's
payment can depend on his own allocation but does not further depend on other players' allocations, such as
which players other than i won. Without this assumption, an entirely new and tricky set of discontinuities
arise. For example, even though player i might happen not to be involved in a tie, small changes in his
bid might a®ect which of two opponents wins a tie (remember that an omniscient tie-breaking rule allows
for this possibility). If this results in a change in the payment rule i faces, then his payo®s may change
discontinuously despite the fact that his bid is not involved in any ties.
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A6 implies that there exists ¤ < 1 such that U 0(x)=U 0(y) < ¤ for all x and y:
So, a player's utility when receiving h objects in the ¯nal allocation when the bid vector
is b and the endowment is e is described by
Ui
0@0@ X
h0·h
vih0
1A ¡ ti(h; e; b)
1A ;
where Ui is a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
3.3 Examples and a Preview of Our Results on a Narrower Class
of Auctions
The general development that follows is involved given the breadth of the class of auctions
handled and the attention paid to allocations and tie-breaking rules. Thus, we o®er some
examples of auctions covered by our existence results and a preview of some of the results
for a narrower class of auctions. This class still includes most standard auction formats.
Although our statements here should be clear, we refer the reader to the subsequent
sections for the formal and more general statements of our results.
We emphasize that in all of the examples that follow there is no assumption about
symmetry of the distribution of the players' endowments, valuations, or utility functions.
(1) A standard ¯rst price single unit auction.
In terms of our de¯nitions and notation this is expressed as follows. There is one
object sold by player 0, and so ` = 1 and the distribution over endowments is such
that Pr(fe = (1; 0; : : : ; 0)g) = 1. The payments are such that an agent pays his bid if
he wins an object (ti(1; e; b) = bi1) and nothing otherwise (ti(0; ei; b) = 0). The reserve
price is b01 = 0. Let C ´ fi 2 N jbi1 ¸ bj1 for all j 2 N [ f0gg (the set of players who
submitted the highest bid). Then, the allocation rule gives the object to player i 2 N
with probability 1=#C if i is in C and 0 otherwise. If C is empty (so that no player
other than 0 bids at least 0), then player 0 retains the object.
Note that because the seller submits a bid at 0; a negative bid by any other player
never wins. Hence, such bids are simply a way for players to express that they have
no interest in winning.
(2) A standard ¯rst price single unit auction with a known reserve price, r ¸ 0.
This is the same as Example (1), except that player 0 sets a reserve price b01 = r.
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(3) A single unit Vickrey (second price) auction.
This is as in (1) or (2), except that the payment rule for a winning bidder changes
to ti(1; e; b) = b2, where b2 is the second highest bid submitted (including the reserve
price b01 = r).
(4) An unfair auction.
This is the same as any of the above examples except that some players pay only some
fraction of the payments indicated above when they win while other players' payments
are unchanged.
(5) An auction with entry costs (and a reserve price).
Let c ¸ 0 be the entry cost incurred by a player wishing to make a bid, where the
decision of whether and how to bid is made without knowing other players' entry
decisions. This is handled in our model as follows. The setting is as in (1), (2), or (3),
except that ti(0; e; b) = c minfbi1+ 1; 1g and ti(1; e; b) = c minfbi1+ 1; 1g+ bi1 for the
¯rst price version (with ti(1; e; b) = c minfbi1 +1; 1g+ b2g for a second price auction).
The form of ti(0; ¢) is chosen so that the function is continuous and satis¯es our as-
sumptions. E®ectively, sending a bid of ¡1 means that the player stays out of the
auction and does not pay the cost c, whereas sending any bid bi ¸ 0 incurs the cost c
of participating. The remaining bids between -1 and 0 are bids that would never be
used in equilibrium since they cannot win an object (given a reserve price of r ¸ 0)
and yet would incur some bidding cost. Thus, the presence of the bids that lie above
-1 and below 0 is just a technical device in this example.
(6) An all pay auction (and various implementations of the war of attrition).
A ¯rst price all pay auction is the same as in (1) except that ti(0; e; b) = ti(1; e; b) =
bi. In the standard war of attrition the winner pays the second highest bid and so
ti(1; e; b) = b2 as in (2), while ti(0; e; b) = bi.
(7) A ¯rst-price procurement auction.
Here ` = 1 and player 0 has e0 = 0: Thus, setting b01 > 0 represents the maximum
amount that 0 will pay for an object. Each player i > 0 has ei = 1. The lowest bidder
among i > 0 sells an object to player 0 provided the bid is no more than b01 (with
ties among players i > 0 broken in any way). The payment if an object is sold by i
to 0 is ti(0; e; b) = ¡bi1. That is, the buyer pays bi1 to the winning seller. Otherwise
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payments are 0. The obvious variation leads to a second-price version of a procurement
auction.19
(8) A multi-unit discriminatory (pay-your-bid) auction
Take ` > 1 and Pr(fe = (`; 0; : : : ; 0)g) = 1. The top ` bids are declared winners, and
payments are ti(h; e; b) =
Ph
w=1 biw.
(9) A multi-unit uniform price auction
As in (8), except that winning players pay the `+ 1-st highest bid for each unit they
acquire, so ti(h; e; b) = hb`+1, where b`+1 is the `+ 1-th highest bid.20;21
(10) A standard double auction.
Players 1 through nb are potential buyers having ei = 0. Players nb + 1 through
n = nb + ns are potential sellers having ei = 1. Ties between a buyer and a seller are
broken in favor of trade, and ties among buyers or among sellers are broken randomly.
Let p =
³
b0 + b00
´
=2; where b0 is the ns-th highest bid, and b00 the ns + 1-th. Then,
ti(0; e; b) = ¡pei; while ti(1; e; b) = p(1¡ ei):
(11) A generalized double auction.
Players 0 through n draw a realization of (ei; vi), and submit bid vectors. Objects are
allocated to the Pni=0 ei highest players, with tie-breaking as in (9). Let ti(h; e; b) =
p (h¡ ei), where p is a weakly increasing and continuous function of the (Pni=0 ei)-th
and (
Pn
i=0 ei) + 1-th highest bids. Note that players may turn out to be buyers or
sellers, even for a given realization of their own type vector, depending on how their
bid vector compares to those of other players.
(12) A double discriminatory auction.
This is the same as (11), except for the payments. If a player ends up as a net buyer
with h objects, he pays
Ph
h0=ei+1 bih0. If i ends up as a net seller, he receives
Pei
h0=h+1 bih0 :
The auctioneer (player 0) pockets the di®erence.
19Extensions to multi-unit procurement auctions are also easily handled.
20There are many variations on ways to select the price paid, including some that ensure that a player's
losing bid does not end up setting the price he pays for his winning bids (such as that suggested by Vickrey
[35]). The particulars of how the price is chosen and even whether it di®ers across players will not matter,
as our theorem will apply in any case.
21Examples (8) and (9) cover the class of private value auctions examined in Swinkels ([33], [34]), and
Jackson and Kremer [11].
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Theorem 1 Each of the auctions described above has an equilibrium in distributional strate-
gies which have support in the closure of the set of undominated strategies.
In one-sided auctions (or more generally, any auction where there is a non-strategic seller
with a reserve below ¹v); the equilibrium above will automatically have trade. When there is
no non-strategic seller, this is less clear. For example in a double auction, there may exist
degenerate equilibria where all sellers bid at the top of the support of values and buyers bid
at the bottom.
Existence of equilibria with a positive probability of trade is guaranteed with two ad-
ditional assumptions. First, we require that changing one player's type does not alter the
support of types for another. In particular, we assume that the Radon-Nikodym derivative of
P with respect to ¦iPi is always positive. Second, we assume that there is some competition
for gains from trade. It is enough to have the support of buyer and sellers' valuations overlap
for all h and to have either at least two buyers or at least two sellers. A weaker condition is
described in Section 5.
Theorem 2 Under the above-mentioned assumptions, each of the auctions described above
has an equilibrium that has support in the closure of the set of undominated strategies and
has a positive probability of trade.
3.4 The General Class of Auctions: Allocations and Tie-Breaking
Rules
We now return to the formal de¯nitions of allocations and tie-breaking, which are needed in
the full statement of our results and to complete a description of the class of auctions that
we consider.
Allocations
An allocation is a vector a 2 f0; `gn+1 ´ A. The component ai is the number of objects
that are allocated to player i.
Consistent Allocations
An allocation is consistent with vectors of endowments and bids (e; b) if
nX
i=0
ai =
nX
i=0
ei:
and
fbjh0 > bih and ai ¸ hg ) aj ¸ h0:
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The ¯rst condition is simply a balance condition, requiring that all objects be accounted
for. Note that this allows for the possible interpretation that objects that are allocated to
the 0 player might be \unsold," for instance in the case where player 0 is the only seller in
an auction.
The second condition simply says that if i receives at least h ¸ 1 objects and j's h0-th
bid exceeds i's hth, then j must get at least h0 objects. Thus, higher bids are given priority
over lower bids in allocating objects.22
Let C(e; b) ½ A denote the set of consistent allocations given endowment and bid vectors
(e; b).
Ties
Say that there is a tie given (e; b) if there exist a and a0 in C(e; b) such that a 6= a0. Say
the tie is at b¤ if
# fi; hjbih > b¤g <
nX
i=0
ei; and
#fi; hjbih ¸ b¤g >
nX
i=0
ei:
So, in the event of a tie at b¤, all bids above b¤ are ¯lled, but there is some discretion in
to whom to allocate objects at b¤. Thus, for instance, it is not a tie if there are two objects
for sale, bidder one has the highest bid, and bidder two has two identical bids which are
the next-highest. Here bidder two has the \tied" bids, but will always get one object in any
allocation.
Tie-Breaking Rules
As discussed in the introduction, we prove existence for a very wide class of tie-breaking
rules, including some fairly strange ones. In particular, we allow for the possibility that the
auctioneer uses more information than just bids and endowments in determining allocations.
An omniscient tie-breaking rule is a (measurable) function o : £ £ B ! ¢(A) such
that o(e; v; b) places probability one on the set of consistent allocations C(e; b). We let
22In some auctions, some players enjoy a special status. For example, some of the PCS auctions subsidized
bids by minority owned ¯rms (see Cramton [4]). One way of implementing this would be to declare the
minority ¯rm a winner if its bid is at least, say, 2/3 of the highest bid. We instead include asymmetries by
insisting on the highest bid winning, but allowing payment rules to di®er, so that, for example, the minority
¯rm pays only 2/3 of its submitted bid.
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o(e; v; b)[a] denote the probability of allocation a under o at (e; v; b); and oi(e; v; b)[h] denote
the probability that i is allocated h objects under o at (e; v; b).23
Given the requirement of consistency, o only has any discretion where there are tied bids,
and hence the term \tie-breaking rule" is appropriate.
Let standard tie breaking be the particular tie-breaking rule which is de¯ned as follows.
Consider a tie at b¤: First, allocate an object to each bid that is strictly above b¤. Next,
allocate an object with equal probability to each player who has an un l¯led buy bid at b¤:
Repeat until all objects are gone, or until there are no un¯lled buy bids at b¤. At this
point, iteratively allocate any remaining objects one at a time with equal probability to
those players who have an un¯lled sell bid at b¤:
The two key aspects of standard tie-breaking are ¯rst that the rule is trade-maximizing,
and second that a bidder's chance of winning an hth object at b¤ does not depend on i's other
bids. This would be false, if, for example, one simply randomly assigned remaining objects
equiprobably over all bids at b¤; as then an h + 1st bid of b¤ would increase the chance that
i receives object h:
While we were led to consider omniscient tie-breaking rules for their use as an interme-
diate step in the proof of existence, it also strikes us that there may be situations in which
tie-breaking that depends on more than just bids might be appropriate. For example, the
government may have objectives beyond those of revenues that would push them to favor
one player over another in the event of a tie. In this value setting, we will see that ties never
occur anyway, so any extra information available to the auctioneer turns out to be irrele-
vant. It is an open question whether meaningful ties occur in other settings, and whether
the possibility of favoritism etc., would have an interesting e®ect in those settings.
Competitive Ties and Trade Maximization
It should be noted that not all ties are the same. On the one hand is a situation in which
two buyers are tied at a given bid, and only one of them receives an object. As we will show,
at least one player will always have an incentive to deviate in this situation. Consider on the
other hand, a situation in which a single buyer and a single seller make a tied bid, but the
object is transferred from buyer to seller at a price under which both are happy to trade.
23Imagine the auctioneer had access to some other information, possibly correlated with player type,
but unobservable to the players at the time they bid. Allowing the auctioneer to also condition on this
information in breaking ties would not expand the set of equilibria beyond those achieved with omniscient
tie-breaking: from the point of view of the players, this is equivalent to the auctioneer simply randomizing
in a way that depends on the types and bids of the players.
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Here, C(e; b) has more than one element, since it is also consistent for trade not to occur.
But, since the object is actually transferred, there is no incentive for either player to change
their bid.
Let us say that (e; b) has a competitive tie if there exists a p such that the number of
buy bids that are greater than or equal to p is not the same as the number of sell bids that
are less than or equal to p.
It turns out that while equilibrium conditions will naturally rule out competitive ties,
non-competitive ties may occur in equilibrium. In particular, it is possible that a buyer and
seller have a tied bid. As long as trade always occurs in this situation, this is not inconsistent
with equilibrium. This is captured in the following condition.
A tie-breaking rule o is trade-maximizing at (v; e; b) if the rule does not specify an alloca-
tion in which one player has an un¯lled buy bid at b and another has an unaccepted sell bid
at b.24 A tie-breaking rule o is trade-maximizing if it is trade-maximizing at every (v; e; b).
We will be working with distributional strategies (see Section 3.5 for details). Given a
probability measure m on £ £ B, say that the rule o is e®ectively trade-maximizing if it is
trade-maximizing on a set of (v; e; b) having measure 1 underm. So, given the way in which
types are drawn and players randomize over bids, the probability that there is a non-trade
maximizing tie is zero.
The next example illustrates the importance of the trade-maximization in our invariance
result.
Example 2 There is a buyer with a valuation for a single unit uniformly drawn from [3; 4];
and a seller with a valuation for a single unit for sale and value uniformly drawn from [0; 1];
where values are independent across players. The price is the midpoint between the bids.
If in the event of a tie between a buy and sell bid the auction mechanism speci¯es that
trade should occur, then it is an equilibrium for both players to bid 2, and for trade to always
occur if both players bid 2. This rule is e®ectively trade maximizing. If instead the auction
mechanism speci¯es that in the event of a tie, trade occurs with a probability ½ < 1, then this
is no longer an equilibrium. Now a buyer would bene t¯ by slightly raise his bid, or a seller
would bene¯t from slightly lowering her bid. In fact, now there is no longer any equilibrium
in which trade always occurs. To see this, suppose the contrary. Then, almost every bid
by the buyer must exceed almost every bid by the seller. But then, a bid near the bottom
24This includes player 0: So, for example, it is only necessary to meet a reserve price, not strictly beat it.
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of the support of buyer's bids wins almost always, and so does strictly better than a higher
bid. Thus, the buyer must be making the same bid bB, regardless of valuation. Similarly, the
seller must be making the same bid bS, regardless of value. Suppose that bS < bB: Then, a
seller can raise his bid and still almost always sell at a better price, a contradiction. Hence
bS = bB = p for some p: But this is a contradiction since the supposition is that trade occurs
with probability ½ < 1 at a tie.
Payments and Bids
We need to say something about how bids determine payments. First, we require that
for any given allocation, a player who is a net buyer is weakly better o® to have submitted
lower bids, and a player who is a net seller is weakly better o® to have submitted higher
bids. Of course, this is holding the allocation constant. Such a change in bid may well result
in the loss of a pro¯table trade. Second, we will require that if one is a net seller, one's buy
bids do not matter, and vice versa.
Assumption 7: (Monotonicity) For any i, and h ¸ ei, ti(h; e; b) is non-decreasing in bih0 for
h0 > ei and constant in bih for h0 · ei; and if h < ei then ti(h; e; b) is non-increasing in bih0
for h0 · ei; and constant in bih0 for h0 > ei:
Note that the condition does not impose any requirements about how a player's payment
depends on the bids of others.
Having buy payments be independent of sell bids, and vice versa, is useful in our weak
domination arguments (for instance Lemma 1 below), and also in establishing the existence
of positive trade (Theorem 5).
Payments at Ties
The following condition on payments is critical to our results. It says that one's marginal
payment when one's hth bid is involved in a tie is a function only of ei; h; and bih: One's
other bids, and the details of how many other players one is tied with, and what their other
bids were, are irrelevant.
Assumption 8: (Known Marginal Transfers at Ties) For all i, h, and ei, there is pihei :
[b;¹b] ! IR such that if (h; e; b) is such that there is a tie at bih, then ti(h; e; b)¡ti(h¡1; e; b) =
pihei(bih).
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This condition is generally satis¯ed and easy to check. For instance, for discriminatory
auctions, uniform price auctions, and all double auctions (where the price is set in the range
of market clearing prices for the submitted demand and supply curves), pih(bih) = bih.25;26
It is also satis¯ed for an all pay auction, where the di®erence in payments does not depend
on whether the player gets an object and so pih(bih) = 0. It is not satis¯ed for a third price
auction for a single unit, since then, even if the ¯rst two bids are tied, the price paid may
vary depending on the third bid.
Our invariance results do not hold when marginal transfers might be decreasing in h:
This e®ectively induces a volume discount, which creates much the same phenomenon as an
upward sloping demand curve: at some bid vectors where the player's two bids are tied, the
player will be unhappy to win a single object, but happy to win two.
Assumption 9: (Monotonic Marginal Payments) For each i; ei; pihei(b) is non-decreasing
in h:
This assumption is trivially satis¯ed where pihei(b) = b or pihei(b) = 0.
To see an example where in the absence of such a condition one might get a rather odd
equilibrium and how this might depend on the tie-breaking rule, consider a case in which
each of three players has marginal value 4 for 2 objects. Half the time, one object is available,
and half the time, four. Assume that payment rules are such that, when there is a tie at a
bid of b¤; a player pays 6 for a ¯rst unit and 1 for a second. Then, it is an equilibrium for all
three players to bid (b¤; b¤) always, as long as tie breaking is that when there is a tie and a
single object, each player receives the object one third of the time, while when there is a tie
and four objects, each player receives two objects with probability two thirds, and no object
with probability one third. Then, by submitting (b¤; b¤) ; a player earns
1
2
·1
3
(4 ¡ 6) + 2
3
(8¡ 6)
¸
=
1
3
:
Consider any deviation in which a player raises either his ¯rst bid or both bids. By the rules
of consistent allocations, this must have him always being allocated the object when there
is only one, and paying at least 6. In the most favorable case, it always has him also win
25Note that in a double auction where a player has a single unit to sell and bi is in a tie, ti(0; 1; bi) = ¡bi
and ti(1; 1; bi) = 0: So, pi1 = 0 ¡ (¡bi) = bi :
26This also holds for Vickrey auctions where the price is the highest bid among other players. Note that
in the case of a tie, since that requires that there must be some discretion in the awarding of objects, the
highest non-winning bid among others must also be tied.
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two objects whenever there are four available. Hence, he earns at most
1
2 (4¡ 6) +
1
2(8 ¡ 6) = 0
from this deviation. Lowering just the second bid results in sometimes winning a ¯rst object
at a loss, and never winning a second object. Lowering both bids results in payo® 0. The
problem here is that the player would e®ectively like to raise his second bid and lower his
¯rst, which is infeasible.
3.5 Strategies and Equilibrium
Given the de¯nitions from the previous subsections, an auction is a speci¯cation of (P; o; t; b0).
That is, an auction consists of a probability measure, a tie-breaking rule, a payment rule,
and a reserve price vector. In what follows, in some cases it will be clear that these are given
and we omit mention of them.
We now turn to formal de¯nitions of the game induced by the auction in terms of strate-
gies and equilibrium.
We write i's expected utility given a (possibly omniscient) tie-breaking rule o, payment
rule t, bid pro l¯e b, valuation vector v, and endowment pro¯le e as
ui(o; t; b; e; v) =
X`
ai=0
o(e; v; b)[ai]Ui
0@0@ X
h·ai
vih
1A ¡ ti(ai; e; b)
1A : (1)
Strategies
A (distributional) strategy for player i is a (Borel) probability measure mi on Bi £ £i
that has a marginal distribution of Pi on £i.
See Milgrom and Weber [23] for discussion of distributional strategies.
Given a pro¯le of distributional strategies m1; : : : ;mn, player i's expected payo® can be
written as:
¼i(m;P; o; t; b0) =
Z
ui(o; t; b; e; v)dm1(b1je1; v1) : : : dmn(bnjen; vn)dP (e; v):
When some of the arguments are ¯xed, we omit them from the notation, and for instance
write ¼(m; o) when all but the tie-breaking rule is ¯xed.
Equilibrium
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A pro¯le of distributional strategies m1; : : : ;mn is an equilibrium for auction (P; o; t; b0)
if
¼i(m;P; o; t; b0) ¸ ¼i(m¡i;cmi; P; o; t; b0)
for all i and strategies cmi.
Weak Dominance
As we wish to prove existence of equilibria that satisfy a re¯nement that will rule out
some trivial equilibria, we establish that players use strategies in the closure of the set of
undominated strategies. The formal de¯nitions are as follows.
Say that bid vector bi is weakly dominated at ei; vi by b0i if
ui(o; t; b¡i; b0i; e; v) ¸ ui(o; t; b¡i; bi; e; v);
for any e¡i; v¡i; b¡i, with strict inequality at least one such pro¯le, where o is standard tie-
breaking. We say that bi is undominated at ei; vi if it is not weakly dominated by any other
bid.
Note that we include the bid of player 0 in this de¯nition, which is not completely
standard, as, at the time that a player submits his bid, he already knows b0: This provides
for a stronger result and actually simpli¯es the proofs.
It is worth discussing why our de¯nition of weak dominance is relative to standard tie-
breaking. With non-standard tie-breaking, some pretty odd behaviors are undominated,
especially in the multiple unit demand case. Consider an example where two players each
value two units. The auction rule is that all objects are sold at the lowest winning bid. Most
of the time, 2 objects are available. Occasionally, there is only 1. Finally, player 2 always
submits two bids of 3. The tie breaking rule, for whatever reason, is that if there is a tie
at 3, and player 1's ¯rst bid is 6, then both objects go to player 1. If player 1's ¯rst bid
is anything else, the second object is allocated at random. Then, when player 2 has value
vector (5; 4); it is undominated for him to bid (6; 3); even though his ¯rst bid is higher than
his ¯rst value. Under standard tie breaking, of course, one's ¯rst bid is irrelevant to the
probability that one's second bid is l¯led if one is involved in a tie, and such a bid vector
is indeed weakly dominated. Although this example is clearly arti¯cial, either explicitly or
implicitly, either approach to existence, via either JSSZ or Reny, requires us to admit this
type of thing as a possibility. Thus to really have the appropriate bite on weakly dominated
strategies, we rule them out under standard tie-breaking rules.
It is well-known that existence of equilibrium in games with continuous action spaces
may require the use of weakly dominated actions. An example is equilibrium in a Bertrand
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game with symmetric constant marginal costs. As such a game has analogs in the auction
setting, we cannot meaningfully require that a distributional strategy puts weight zero on
weakly dominated bids. It is, however, coherent to require that the distributional strategy
put probability 1 on the closure of the set of non-weakly dominated bids.
To formalize this, let W 0i ½ £i £Bi be the set of ei; vi; bi such that bi is undominated for
i given ei; vi: Let Wi be the closure of W 0i .
Assumption 10: (Undominated Strategies). For each player i 2 N; there is a measurable
map !i : £i £ Bi ! £i £ Bi such that for each (ei; vi; bi) ; !i (ei; vi; bi) = (ei; vi; b0i) where
b0i = bi if (ei; vi; bi) 2Wi; and b0i weakly dominates bi given (ei; vi) if (ei; vi; bi) =2Wi.
A10 states that one can, in a measurable way, identify bids so that whenever (ei; vi; bi) =2
Wi then bi is replaced by a bid that weakly dominates it and results in an element of Wi:
Of course, for this to be satis¯ed, one needs to know that Wi is in fact non-empty
relative to each (ei; vi): For general games with continuum action spaces, this need not be
so. Consider a game with action space [0; 1]; and payo®s equal to action for all actions less
than 1, but equal to -1 for action 1. Then, all actions are weakly (in fact strictly) dominated.
The question in the auction setting is whether similar things might arise, especially once one
considers what happens to payo®s at ties (where it is easy to construct bid vectors relative
to which there is no best response).
We have not found a sensible auction-like example where A10 fails. For example, in a
¯rst price auction (or a discriminatory multiple unit auction), any bid less than value is
undominated: any higher bid may simply result in bidding more in situations where one
might already have won, while any lower bid may result in the loss of a pro¯table purchase.
W thus includes all bids in which one bids at or below value. Similarly, in a second price
auction, a bid equal to value is not weakly dominated. And, in either case, replacing buy
bids above value (or sell bids below value) by bids at value is clearly measurable.27 In an all
pay auction, a bid of zero is not weakly dominated, and replacing bids above value by 0 is
again clearly measurable. Using these two ideas, it is easy to check that A10 is satis¯ed for
all the auctions discussed in Section 3.3.
A useful observation is the following:
Lemma 1 Under A1-A10, given (ei; vi); let bi be any bid vector such that pihei(bih) < vih for
some h · ei, or pihei(bih) > vih for some h > ei. Then (ei; vi; bi) =2Wi.
27In an unfair ¯rst price auction in which player 1 pays, say, 2/3 of his bid, one would replace bids above
3vi=2 by bids of 3vi=2:
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That such a bid vector is weakly dominated at (ei; vi); so that (ei; vi; bi) =2 W 0i can be
seen as follows. If one raises a sell bid where pihei(bih) < vih; then the only change can be
to either sell one less object, which originally sold at a loss, or to raise the market price as
a seller, either of which bene¯ts the player. By A7, there can be no change if one was a net
buyer before the change in bid. A similar argument applies when one lowers a buy bid where
pihei(bih) > vih: Note that the same argument will be true for nearby (e0i; v 0i;b0i) : Hence, a
neighborhood of (ei; vi; bi) is outside of W 0i; and so (ei; vi; bi) =2 Wi: A slightly more detailed
proof appears in the appendix.
We say that a pro¯le of distributional strategies m is undominated¤ if each mi places
probability one on Wi.
4 Invariance and Existence
We now state our ¯rst main result.
Theorem 3 If an auction (P; o; t; b0) satis¯es A1-A10 and o is trade-maximizing, then it
has at least one undominated¤ equilibrium. Moreover, if m is such an equilibrium, then the
probability of competitive ties under m is 0; and m remains an equilibrium under any omni-
scient and e®ectively trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule, including standard tie-breaking.
Our route for the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows. We begin with invariance: we show
that any undominated¤ equilibrium must have zero probability of any player being involved in
a competitive tie and would also be an equilibrium if we changed the method of tie-breaking
to any other e®ectively trade-maximizing omniscient tie-breaking rule. Using invariance, if
we can establish existence of an equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies for some
omniscient tie-breaking rule, this implies existence of (the same) equilibrium under any tie-
breaking rule, omniscient or standard. This second step is fairly easily established via either
of two results, either JSSZ, or Reny.
The discussion of invariance appears in the next subsection (4.1). The step from in-
variance to existence is in subsection (4.2), with additional details in the appendix. Those
not interested in the proof can proceed directly to Section 5 to ¯nd results establishing the
existence of equilibria with a positive probability of trade, an important issue in auctions
such as double-auctions.
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4.1 Invariance
The fact that ties are the critical worry for establishing existence of equilibrium follows from
the fact that ties are the only potential points of discontinuity. So, intuitively, if we establish
that players prefer to avoid ties, then we show that the discontinuities are not important,
which in turn allows us to establish the existence of equilibrium. Let us go right to the heart
of the matter.
Lemma 2 Consider any auction (P; o; t; b0) satisfying A1-A10 and any pro¯le of strategies
m. For each " > 0 and any bidder i 2 N there exists m0i within " of mi28 such that m¡i;m0i
is tie-free for i29 and ¼i(m¡i;m0i) ¸ ¼i(m¡i;mi)¡ ".
Lemma 2 shows that for any pro l¯e of strategies, any player can ¯nd a close-by strategy
that does not involve any ties and does nearly as well as her original strategy.30
Note that the Lemma 2 does not put any requirements on o or on m, and so it allows for
tie-breaking that is not trade-maximizing and for strategies that are in weakly dominated
strategies.
Lemma 3 Fix an auction (P; o; t; b0) satisfying A1-A10. Let m be undominated¤, and either
have a positive probability of ties where o is not trade-maximizing or a positive probability of
competitive ties. Then, there exists some bidder i 2 N and a strategy m0i such that m¡i;m0i
is tie-free for i and
¼i(m¡i;m0i; P; o; t; b0) > ¼i(m;P; o; t; b0):
Lemma 3 shows that for any pro l¯e of strategies placing probability one on the closure
of the set of undominated strategies, but involving a positive probability of competitive
ties or non-competitive ones that are not trade-maximizing, some player has an improving
deviation. This implies that if there exists an undominated¤ equilibrium, then it must not
involve any such ties.
The proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 appear in the appendix. The idea behind Lemma 2 is
fairly straightforward. Essentially, one bumps bids bih for which vih > pihei(bih) up slightly
28Use the topology of weak convergence.
29That is, m¡i ;m0i leads to a probability 0 of i being involved in a tie.
30It is important to remark that this is not the same as establishing better-reply-security as de¯ned by Reny
[26]. Better-reply-security does not hold here, as we discuss in more detail below. We are not considering
all payo®s that may be reached in the closure of the graph of the game; only ones that directly correspond
to the strategies in question.
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and bids for which vih · pihei(b) down slightly in such a way as to avoid bids made by other
players with positive probability. Any change in trade this brings about is at most slightly
unpro¯table. For example, if a buy bid is bumped up, and wins an extra object, then the
payment for the object is approximately pihei(bih): Since the change in bids is small, the pro¯t
of the player when his allocation does not change is also little a®ected. The detailed proof
is slightly more involved, because (a) it has to be checked that one can always perform this
perturbation consistently across di®erent h, (b) one needs to perform this perturbation in a
measurable fashion across bids and types so that the composition of the original distributional
strategy and the perturbation remains a valid distributional strategy, and (c) the possibility
that odd tie breaking might result in a small change in a non-marginal bid a®ecting whether
or not a marginal bid wins must be taken account of.
To see Lemma 3, assume that there is a positive probability of a competitive tie or a
non-competitive but non-trade maximizing tie at b¤ Since m is undominated¤, by Lemma
1, a player will not submit a buy bid bih = b¤ where vih < pihei(bih) or a sell bid where
vih > pihei(bih): Since the distribution of values is atomless, there is zero probability that
vih = pihei(b¤): Hence, almost all the buyers at that tie would strictly prefer to buy, and
almost all sellers would prefer to sell. But, no matter what the omniscient tie-breaking
rule, if there is a positive probability of a competitive tie or a non-competitive and non-
trade-maximizing tie at some b¤, then at least one player who would bene¯t from trade is
sometimes \losing" the tie, and so strictly bene¯t by the deviation described above.
When we put Lemmas 2 and 3 together, we end up with the following implication.
Theorem 4 (Invariance) If an auction (P; o; t; b0) satis¯es A1-A10, and an undominated¤
pro l¯e of distributional strategies m is an equilibrium, then under m there is zero probability
of a competitive tie or non-competitive ties where o is not trade-maximizing, and m remains
an equilibrium for (P; o0; t; b0) for any trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule o0.
Note that the conclusion that we can switch from o to o0 and still have m be an equilib-
rium, is not a direct implication of Lemma 3. It may be that m is a equilibrium under o,
but o0 would induce some player to deviate to establish a new tie. This possibility is ruled
out using Lemma 2, as the following short proof shows.
Proof of Theorem 4: The fact thatmmust be free of competitive ties and non-competitive
ties where o is not trade-maximizing follows directly from Lemma 3. Let us argue that m is
also an equilibrium for (P; o0; t; b0). Given that any ties occurring with positive probability
underm must be non-competitive and where o is trade-maximizing,m must lead to the same
26
payo® vector u under both o and o0. Now, suppose to the contrary of the theorem that m is
not an equilibrium under o0. Then there exists i andm0i such that ¼i(m¡i;m0i; P; o0; t; b0) > ui.
By Lemma 2 we can ¯nd m00i which is tie-free for i and such that ¼i(m¡i;m00i ; P; o0; t; b0) > ui.
Sincem¡i;m00i is tie-free for i it follows that ¼i(m¡i;m00i ; P; o; t; b0) = ¼i(m¡i;m00i ; P; o0; t; b0) >
ui, contradicting the fact that m is an equilibrium at o.
The conclusions of Theorem 4 can fail if one ventures beyond private values. This can be
seen in Example 1 of JSSZ, where there exists an equilibrium for a non-standard tie-breaking
rule, but none exists for standard tie-breaking.
4.2 Two Proofs of Theorem 3
Theorem 4 establishes that any undominated¤ equilibrium can only involve trade-maximizing
non-competitive ties, and will remain an equilibrium for any trade-maximizing tie-breaking
rule. Thus, to prove Theorem 3 we need only prove that there exists an undominated¤
equilibrium for some tie-breaking rule.
We think that it is instructive to o®er proofs via both JSSZ and Reny, as at this point they
are both fairly straightforward. Moreover, this clari¯es the relationship between these two
methodologies, which may be useful in further applications and in understanding existence
issues more broadly.
We ¯rst construct an auxiliary game where dominated strategies are penalized according
to their distance from the set of undominated strategies. Equilibria in this game must involve
undominated strategies. It is also easy to see that these remain equilibria when the penalty
of domination is removed (being careful with some details regarding the tie-breaking rule).
This is stated in the following Lemma.
Consider the game G(P; o; t; b0) in which when any player i uses bi with type ei; vi; he
pays a penalty ci(ei; vi; bi) in additional to the payo® he receives from (P; o; t; b0), where ci
is the distance of a point from the set Wi.31
Lemma 4 Consider an auction (P; o; t; b0) and the auxiliary G(P; o; t; b0) that penalizes weakly
dominated strategies. Let m be an equilibrium of G(P; o; t; b0). Then, m is undominated¤
and is an equilibrium of the original auction (P; o; t; b0).
31Take the distance of a point from the (closed) set Wi to be the minimum of the distances from that
point to points in the set.
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If G(P; o; t; b0) has an equilibrium m for some o, then by Lemma 4, so does the original
auction. Then by Theorem 4, m remains an equilibrium for any other trade-maximizing o.
This would then complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Proving Theorem 3 using JSSZ's Endogenous Tie-Breaking Rules.
Theorem 1 in JSSZ implies that there exists an equilibrium m in an augmented form of
G(P; o; t; b0) where players also (truthfully) announce their types and tie-breaking depends
on those announcements. Those strategies remain an equilibrium when we ignore type
announcements, and change the tie-breaking rule to directly depend on types rather than
announced types. Thus, there exists an equilibrium of G(P; o; t; b0) and hence the original
auction for some omniscient tie-breaking rule o; and we are done.
The only detail to check is that G(P; o; t; b0) falls into the class of games identi¯ed by
JSSZ. This follows from checking two things. First, it is clear that the correspondence taking
bid vectors into distributions over consistent allocations (outcomes in JSSZ) is upper hemi-
continuous, non-empty and convex-valued. Second, JSSZ write payo®s as an inner product
of a ¯nite set of functions uk which are continuous in actions and types, and an outcome
function which depends on actions and leads to probabilities over the uk's. Here, the uk's
are simply the utilities that a player gets conditional on getting a ¯xed number of objects,
and the outcome function is the tie-breaking rule (see Equation 1). These are continuous,
given the continuity both of the payment rules t; and of the penalty to weakly dominated
strategies.
Proving Theorem 3 using Reny's better-reply-security.
Again, we consider G(P; o; t; b0). In fact, here the penalties are necessary not only for
establishing existence of an equilibrium in non-weakly dominated strategies, but because
the game without these penalties can fail to satisfy the conditions of Reny. We return to
illustrate this with an example below.
The following de¯nitions and conditions from Reny are the critical ones.
A player i can secure a payo® of ® atm¡i if there is a strategy mi such that ¼i(m0¡i;mi) ¸
® for all m¡i in some neighborhood of m¡i.32
A game is better reply secure if for any m¤; u¤ in the closure of the graph of the vector
payo® function, if m¤ is not an equilibrium, then there exists i who can secure a payo®
strictly above u¤i at m¤¡i.
32Again, use the topology of weak convergence of measures on the distributional strategies (which leads
to a compact set of strategies).
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It follows from Theorem 3.1 in Reny [26] that if G(P; o; t; b0) is better reply secure, then
G(P; o; t; b0) has an equilibrium, and we will have once again concluded the proof of Theorem
3.33
So, it remains to verify that the (penalized) auction satis¯es better-reply-security. It is
tempting to read-better-reply security as saying \whenever a player has a better reply, he
has a secure better reply" and downplay the importance of taking the closure of the graph of
the payo® function of the game rather than just considering the graph itself. The following
example shows the key role played by the closure operation.
Example 3 Consider a ¯rst price auction (with standard tie-breaking) with 2 players and
one object for sale. Player 1's value is always 1 and player 2's value is always 2. This
game violates better-reply-security. In particular, consider m¤; u¤ where both players bid 1
and u¤ = (0; 1) (because player 2 always wins the object). This is the limit, for instance, of
a sequence of bids where player 1 always bids 1 and 2's bids approach 1 from above.34 It is
easy to see that m¤ is not an equilibrium of the auction and yet neither player can secure (or
even obtain) a payo® above u¤ via a deviation. Hence better-reply-security fails. If one just
considers m;u's in the graph of the game, then it is easy to check that for any better reply
there exists a secure better reply. So, the failure of better-reply-security comes at a point in
the closure of the graph of the game, but not in the graph of the game.
Fascinatingly, despite the fact that this game fails better-reply-security, not only does it
have Nash equilibria, but m¤; u¤ is in fact the limit of such equilibria! Let player 1 randomize
uniformly over a small interval (1¡ "; 1); and player 2 always bid 1. Player 1 does not want
to bid more, since the object is only worth 1 to him. And, for small enough "; player 2 does
not want to bid anything less than 1. As "! 0; the limit distributional strategies and payo®s
are m¤; u¤: This provides a sharp example in which better-reply-security is su±cient but not
necessary for existence.
It is also useful to point out that if one breaks all ties in favor of player 2, then m¤; u¤ is
Nash. This illustrates that our invariance result (Theorem 4) can fail when there are atoms
in the distribution of types.
33Reny's Theorem 3.1 requires a quasi-concavity of payo®s and a compactness of strategies. Compactness
has already been established. Even though the U i's we have considered here are not necessarily quasi-
concave, note that payo®s are in fact linear in m, as these are distributional strategies and preferences are
von Neumann-Morgenstern.
34It is useful to point out that endogenous tie-breaking would actually prescribe the tie-breaking rule
which gives the object to player 2 at a tied bid of 1, and would lead to an equilibrium under this alternative
tie-breaking rule.
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The example makes it clear that to verify better-reply-security we need to have some
handle on the possible m¤; u¤ that are in the closure of the graph of the auction in question.
Generally, doing this directly will be complicated. For instance, consider a bid vector with
three tied players 1,2,3; one could approach this vector from a sequence that has player 3
always winning, or with 1 and 2 tied and always winning, or any of a continuum of other
possibilities. Once we are in auctions with many objects and allow for the mixing possible
under distributional strategies, the potential limit points are quite complex.35
The key to verifying better-reply-security comes back to the use of omniscient tie-breaking
rules! This is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Consider an auction (P; o; t; b0). For each m¤; u¤ in the closure of the graph
G(P; o; t; b0), there exists an omniscient tie-breaking rule o¤ such that u¤ is the payo® vector
induced under G(P; o¤; t; b0) by m¤.
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider a sequence (mk; uk) in the graph the graph G(P; o; t; b0)
converging to m¤; u¤. Then each mk along with o induces a measure M k on £ £ B £ A,
which leads to the utilities uk. Taking a subsequence if necessary, the sequence of M k's
converges weakly to a measureM ¤ on ££B£A. Given that utility functions are continuous
on ££ B £ A (A is ¯nite), the corresponding utilities induced under M ¤ are u¤. Note that
M ¤ can be induced by an omniscient tie-breaking rule o¤ coupled with m¤ (see, for instance,
Lemma 2 in Simon and Zame [31]).
Now let us use Lemma 5 to verify better-reply-security to complete the proof of Theorem
3.
Consider anym¤; u¤ in the closure of the graph of G(P; o; t; b0) which is not an equilibrium
of G(P; o; t; b0). By Lemma 5 there exists an omniscient tie-breaking rule o¤ such that u¤ is
35Recall from the introduction that another way to apply Reny's result is via reciprocal upper semicon-
tinuity, and tie-breaking that maximizes the sum of the player surpluses. Under this technique, one can
a priori restrict agents to the closure of the non-weakly dominated strategies, side-stepping the penalty
functions we use. Reciprocal upper semicontinuity is intuitively obvious, since any ties that exist along a
sequence of bids pro¯les also exist in the limit, and hence the auctioneer has at least as much discretion in
the limit as he did late in the sequence. Because we are working in the space of distributional strategies, this
pointwise arguments needs to be applied with some care. One also has to be careful about the di®erence
between e±cient tie-breaking and that which maximizes the sum of payo®s to players other than 0, as it is
easy to generate examples where along a sequence, allocations are ine±cient, but result in low payments to
the auctioneer, while the limiting (e±cient) allocation raises these payo®s by enough that players are worse
o® in aggregate. We chose the direct application of Reny's better reply security becaue of the insight it
provides into the relationship between better reply security and endogenous tie-breaking rules.
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the payo® vector induced under G(P; o¤; t; b0) bym¤. By Lemma 4 we can deduce that m¤ is
not an equilibrium of G(P; o¤; t; b0). To see this, suppose otherwise. Then by Lemma 4 m¤
is an equilibrium of (P; o¤; t; b0) and is undominated¤. Then by Theorem 4 it would be an
equilibrium of (P; o; t; b0) and since m¤ is undominated¤, it would also be an equilibrium of
G(P; o; t; b0), which would be a contradiction. Thus there exists an improving deviation mi
relative to the game G(P; o¤; t; b0). By Lemma 2, this improving deviation mi can be taken
to be tie-free.36 Then mi remains tie-free for all strategies in a neighborhood of m¤¡i, and so
player i's payo® is continuous in m¡i in this neighborhood and the payo® is independent of
the tie breaking rule. Thus, mi secures a payo® above u¤i at m¤¡i relative to G(P; o; t; b0), as
required by better-reply-security.
Finally, let us return to the issue of why penalizing weakly dominated strategies is im-
portant to verifying better-reply-security.
Example 4 Consider a two-player and one-object ¯rst-price auction, with standard tie-
breaking. Player 1 has v1 uniformly distributed on [0; 1], and player 2 has v2 uniformly
distributed on [2; 3]. This auction satis¯es all of our assumptions, and indeed has an equi-
librium. Nevertheless, (P; o¤; t; b0) fails to satisfy better-reply-security; only G(P; o¤; t; b0)
satis¯es it. To see this, consider m¤; u¤ such that under m¤ both players always bid 1.5 and
u¤ = (0; 1). This is in the closure of the graph, by considering a sequence where player 1
always bids 1.5 and player 2 bids 1:5 + 1k (regardless of valuation). Relative to u
¤, neither
player has an improving deviation, even though m¤ is not an equilibrium of the auction with
the usual tie-breaking rule, and so better-reply-security fails.
4.3 Comments on Endogenous Sharing and better-reply-security.
It is interesting that the tricky part of the proof using better-reply-security is to get a handle
on the u¤'s in the closure of the game. The fact that they are those generated by omniscient
tie-breaking suggests a deeper connection between the machinery of Reny and that of JSSZ.
That is, a proof of existence via \apply JSSZ and check that some equilibria correspond
to nice tie-breaking" and \check better-reply-security" are closely related. Because of the
requirement that better-reply-security apply relative to all points in the closure of the graph,
36To be careful, Lemma 2 would apply to G(P; o¤; t; b0) rather than (P; o¤; t; b0). It is a direct extension
that it holds for G(P; o¤; t; b0) as well.
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rather than just the graph, one has to understand exactly what might be in that closure;
and the points in the closure are precisely the points that come from omniscient choices at
points of discontinuity. On the other hand, in applying JSSZ, one has to understand the
equilibria that might be generated under omniscient choices at points of discontinuity. In
the auction setting, these two tasks are closely related. How these approaches turn out to
be related and which might be more e±cient in other settings is an open question.
4.4 A Corollary on Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria.
As mentioned in the introduction, while Theorem 3 establishes existence of equilibrium in
distributional strategies, in some contexts one can use additional structure to argue for the
existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria.37 Let us present one such result.
Consider a situation where the distribution over types is independent across players and
players are risk neutral.
In order to establish this result for this general class of auctions, we need to impose some
restrictions on the interaction of a player's bids for di®erent objects. We strengthen (A8) as
follows.
For any (e; b) and i such that i is not involved in any competitive ties (so that i's allocation
is unique), let Ti(e; b) be the total payment made by i.
Assumption 80: A8 holds. In addition, consider any (e; b) and (e; b¡i; b0i) such that i is not
involved in any competitive ties, and h such that bi;¡h; b0ih and b0i;¡h; bih are both valid bid
vectors. Then,
T (e; b¡i; bi) ¡ T(e; b¡i; bi;¡h; b0ih) = T (e; b¡i; b0i;¡h; bih) ¡ T(e; b¡i; b0i):
(A80) states that, holding the overall endowment and the bids of the other players con-
stant, the e®ect of a change in i's hth bid on his payments is a function only of what the
change in that hth bid is, irrespective of i's other bids as long as this change is feasible.38
37In terms of distributional strategies, a pure strategy is any strategy that puts probability one on the
graph of a function from types to bids, f : £ ! B , where f = (f1; : : : ; fn) and fi : £i ! Bi. A strategy
is monotone if the f is such that higher valuation vectors lead to (weakly) higher bid vectors - holding the
endowment constant. That is, for any i if v0ih > vih for each h, then fi(v
0
i; ei) ¸ f (vi ;ei).
38Given (A8), a su±cient condition for (A80) is that @Ti (e;b)@ bih be well de¯ned when no other bidder has a
bid equal to bih, and this partial derivative depends only on (h; e), bih and the rank of bih among all bids.
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This condition is satis¯ed by all the standard auction formats. In (multi-unit) discriminatory
and all pay auctions a change in i's hth bid only a®ects the payment attributed to the hthh
object (in the all-pay auction this is whether or not the object is won), and so the change
in payment is una®ected by the level of the rest of i's bid vector. In a Vickrey auction, the
change in i's hth bid can only a®ect whether i gets an hth object, and if it does then the
price for that additional object depends on the bids of the other agents, and is independent
of the rest of i's bid vector. In a multi-unit uniform price auction, an additional feature
arises in that the hth bid might be setting the price for i's other objects. However, for any
feasible bid vector where i's hth bid is setting the price, i must be getting h¡ 1 objects, and
so the change in payments is then also irrespective of the level of i's other bids subject to
this change of hth bid being feasible.
This rules out settings where, for example, the price to players other than some player
j in a multiple unit auction is a smoothly changing convex combination of the Vickrey and
highest rejected bid rule, depending on the bid of player j. It also rules out a multiple unit
variant of the 3rd price auction in which the price is set by the second highest rejected bid.
In this setting, knowledge that one's 2nd bid has rank
P
ei + 2 does not tie down the e®ect
of a change in bid on payments, since one's highest bid may or may not be among the ¯rstP
ei:
Corollary 1 Consider any auction satisfying (A1) to (A10) and (A80), where types are
independent across players, the marginal distribution of each player's vector of values is
absolutely continuous with respect to `-dimensional Lebesgue measure, and each player i¸ 1
is risk-neutral. There exists a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in undominated¤ strategies
with a zero probability of competitive ties, which is an equilibrium under any omniscient and
e®ectively trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule, including standard tie-breaking.
The proof of Corollary 1 appears in the appendix. The basic ideas are fairly straight-
forward, although the details are slightly more involved. Under (A80), risk-neutrality, and
independence, a change in a bid for the hth object by i can be considered essentially inde-
pendently of bids for other objects. So, a change in one bid does not change the e®ect on
payments of a change in another. And, independence also implies that the change of a bid
a®ects payments and the probability of winning a given object in a way that is independent
of a player's valuation. Thus, given private values, if raising a bid is weakly bene¯cial at
one valuation, it is strictly bene¯cial at any higher valuation. This implies monotonicity and
pure strategies to the extent that changes in bids matter. To complete the picture, we use a
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modi¯cation of the auction that is similar to the seeding argument we use to prove positive
trade in the next section, and is also in the spirit of a technique subsequently used by Kazu-
mori [14] to argue for existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria. In particular, with a
small probability one introduce extra bidders who randomly bid at all levels for all objects
and vary the available supply to take on any possible value. This implies that any change in
bids matters, and then bids must be monotone and hence pure (almost) everywhere. Taking
careful limits as the noise goes to 0, one can use results of JSSZ and the invariance results
(Theorem 4) to deduce a monotone pure strategy equilibrium of the original auction.
It is also worth noting that even without the perturbation arguments, bids must be
increasing over ranges where they matter. What is possible is that some equilibria might
involve players mixing or bidding non-monotonically over a range of bids all of which, for
example, never win. In the single unit case, one can e®ectively purify such equilibria. Doing
so in the multiple unit case seems more daunting, and so it is open whether the auctions
described might have other equilibria meaningfully di®erent from the monotone equilibria
we have shown to exist.
5 Equilibria with a Positive Probability of Trade
For some auction settings, a major potential weakness in the existence result (Theorem 3)
as currently stated is that there may be a zero probability of trade. Consider, for example, a
simple double auction (as in Example 9 above). There is an equilibrium that puts probability
one on the closure of the set of undominated strategies in this auction where sellers always
bid ¹v; and buyers always bid 0: Buyers know that sellers are never making serious bids and
sellers know that buyers are never making serious bids, and thus their own non-serious bids
are best responses, and yet undominated strategies are used.39 So, it could be that Theorem
3 has only \proven" that this degenerate equilibrium exists.
In this section we establish the existence of an equilibrium with a positive probability of
trade, for the auctions in our class.
First, we note that in some cases it is straightforward to see that each equilibrium iden-
ti¯ed in Theorem 3 must involve a positive probability of trade. In particular, consider the
case where the non-strategic player 0 is active if P0 (fe0 > 0g) > 0 and that when e0 > 0;
player 0 sets a reserve price for at least one of his units so that there is a positive probability
that some buyer has a value for a ¯rst unit that would lead to a positive utility if they were
39In fact, the equilibrium satis¯es a trembling hand perfection requirement, as discussed in Jackson and
Swinkels [12].
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to be allocated it at a bid of the reserve price (for simple pricing rules, this reduces simply to
a reserve below the highest possible buy value). Then, there is clearly trade in equilibrium.
So, the issue of establishing existence of equilibria with a positive probability of trade
involves settings where player 0 is not active, as in a double auction. We use three additional
assumptions. The ¯rst two are critical, the third a convenience.
The ¯rst assumption rules out too much dependence in the distribution of values. Essen-
tially, it requires only that changing one player's type does not alter the support of possible
types for another, and is consistent with any ¯nite likelihood ratio on the distribution of
values within that support. As such, it is quite weak.
Assumption 11: (Full Support Prior) f (µ) > 0 for all µ 2 £, where f is the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of P with respect to
Q
i Pi:
Given that f is a continuous function (A3) and £ is compact (A2), f (µ) > 0 implies that
there exists 1 >M >M 0 > 0 such that M > f (µ) > M 0 for all µ 2 £: The new content of
A11 over that of A2 and A3, is of course, the existence of M 0.40
We use A11 to show that the fact that types are not perfectly correlated translates into
the same feature for bids (see Lemma 6 in the appendix).
Our second assumption ensures that there is some possibility of serious competition for
the gains to trade. This guarantees that some players (e.g., buyers) will be forced to make
bids that are attractive enough to induce other players (e.g., sellers) to be active.
Assumption 12: (Competition for Gains from Trade). Let w be the max of the support of
the distribution over all buy values, and w the min of the support of the distribution over
sell values. Let [w; ¹w] ½ [b;¹b] and at least one of the following hold:
(1) For each player who ever has a buy value above w, there is a positive probability that
the remaining players have at least `+ 1 sell values below w, or
(2) For each player who ever has a sell value below w, there is a positive probability that
the remaining players have at least `+ 1 buy values above w.
For some insight into A12, consider a standard double auction. Then, as long as there
are two or more sellers who sometimes have values below w or two or more buyers who
40It should be noted that the amount of trade guaranteed by the proof of Theorem 5 depends on M 0; and
that when M 0 is small, so is the amount of trade that is guaranteed to occur. See Cripps and Swinkels [5] for
a demonstration that under mild conditions, as the number of players grows, trade in any such non-trivial
equilibria converges to the Walrasian level.
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sometimes have values above w; A12 is satis¯ed. Within the standard double auction, we
are ruling out only the case of one buyer and one seller.41 The condition involving ` + 1
extends this to multiple unit demands. It rules out, for example, a setting in which there is
a single buyer demanding 3 units, and two sellers, each with one unit to sell. Here, there is
no real competition among the sellers. This assumption of having competition is used in our
proof of Theorem 5 in showing that seeding trade then leads to positive amounts of trade,
but this condition is clearly not always necessary for getting positive trade in equilibrium.
When players can be either buyers or sellers a priori, the condition is slightly more
intricate. In particular, consider a case where there are three players. Player 1 always has
endowment 0, and value uniform on [:5; :6]. Player 2 always has endowment 1, and value
uniform on [:4; :5]: Finally, player 3 half the time has endowment 0 and value uniform on
[:9; 1]; and half the time endowment 1 and value uniform on [0; :1]: Then, the condition fails,
because the only time that player 3 has a high buy value, there is only one seller, and the
only time player 3 has a low sell value, there is only one buyer. Hence, there is really no
competition for the gains to trade generated by the existence of player 3.
Finally, in establishing existence, we did not need a direct tie between the level of bids
and the prices paid, other than some continuity and monotonicity conditions. In order to
use a \seeding trade" argument, it is convenient to have a tighter feel for how payments vary
with bids. The following assumption does this.
Assumption 13: (Marginal Transfers Equal Bids) For any i, h, and e; ti(h; e; b) ¡ ti(h ¡
1; e; b) = bih:
A13 states that when a player is involved in tie, he pays his bid. This is true for any
sensible double auction rule, as when there is a tie at b¤; then b¤ is the only price which
clears the market for the submitted demand and supply curves.
We can now state our second main result.
Theorem 5 Each auction (P; o; t; b0) satisfying A1-A13 has an undominated¤ equilibrium
that has a positive probability of trade.
Given Theorem 5, and recalling our discussion of auctions in which player 0 is active, we
obtain the following corollary.
41See Kadan [13] for a proof of existence in the bilateral case.
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Corollary 2 Let (P; o; t; b0) satisfy A1-A10. If either player 0 is active42 (as in a one
sided auction), or A11-A13 are satis¯ed, then there exists an undominated¤ equilibrium that
has a positive probability of trade.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 5 can be seen in a simpli¯ed setting. Think about
the case of two buyers each desiring one object, and two sellers each with one object to sell,
where the marginal of P onto each player's value has support [w;w]; and where values are
not too dependent, so that A11 is satis¯ed. Since buyers and sellers are distinct, A12 is also
satis¯ed.
We \seed" trade in the following manner. Consider a sequence of modi¯ed auctions
indexed by x, in which we add a 5th player who 1=x of the time has e5 = 1 and makes a sell
o®er which is uniform on [w;w]; 1=x of the time has e5 = 0 and makes a buy o®er which is
uniform on [w;w], and the remainder of the time has e5 = 0 and makes no bids, where all
of this is independent of (e; v). Clearly, any equilibrium in auction x must have some trade,
as otherwise someone should behave in a way to trade with player 5 when he is active.
Now let us argue that trade is in fact bounded away from zero as x ! 1: Suppose to
the contrary that as x ! 1; the amount of trade heads to zero. The only way this can
happen is that the probability that buyers o®er above w vanishes as does the probability
that sellers ask less than w: To see this, assume for example, that there is probability ° of a
sell bid below w ¡ °: Then this sell bid must go un¯lled with a probability going to one as
otherwise there would be a non-degenerate amount of trade. So, consider the strategy for
buyers where they bid w¡° whenever they have a value of at least w¡ °=2. Under A11 this
would win with a probability bounded away from 0. Hence, there is a strategy available to
buyers that earns an amount bounded away from zero. But then, equilibrium pro¯ts must
also be bounded away from zero, which is inconsistent with the expected amount of trade
going to zero.
So, we have argued that in order for trade to vanish, it must be that with probability
approaching one both sellers are asking almost w; and both buyers are o®ering nearly w:
However, this cannot be part of an equilibrium by the following argument. Because of A12,
there is a positive probability that simultaneously, both sellers (or both buyers) would be
willing to buy the object at the value of one of the buyers. So, think about deviating to
a slightly lower bid as a seller. If there was no high buy bid, this is costless. So, we can
condition payo®s on the event that there is at least one high buy bid, whether by player 5 or
by one of the buyers. Because of player 5; this is a positive probability event. But, for each of
42This requires that player 0 set a reserve price for selling at least one of the objects below w (or above w
in a procurement auction).
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player 5 and the two buyers, the probability of a high buy bid is very small. So, since values
(and hence bids) are somewhat independent, conditional on there being any high buy bid,
there is almost surely only one high buy bid. But then, since there is a positive probability of
both sellers simultaneously being interested, they will have an incentive to compete against
each other to be the one who trades in this event. This rules out that sell bids are very high
almost always, giving a contradiction.
Essentially then, the presence of the extra player pushes the equilibrium away from the
pure no-trade one. But, once there is some trade, A12 implies that there will be competition
by sellers (or buyers) to be the one who trades in the rare event that it occurs. This
competition pushes bids away from the boundary in a way that implies a minimum positive
level of trade which is independent of x. In the limit, as x ! 1 this generates a positive
trade equilibrium of the original game.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume b is such that pihei(bih) < vih for some h · ei: Let h0 be the lowest index for
which this is true. Now, by de¯nition, bi;h0¡1 ¸ bi;h0 : And, since pi;h0¡1;ei(bi;h0¡1) ¸ vi;h0¡1 ¸
vi;h0 > pi;h0;ei(bi;h0); it follows that bi;h0¡1 > bi;h (recall from A9 that pi;h0¡1;ei(x) · pi;h0;ei(x);
so it cannot be the case that bi;h0¡1 = bi;h): Raise bih0 by " > 0; where " < bi;h0¡1 ¡ bi;h0 ;
and where vi;h0 > pi;h0 ;ei(b0ih0 ) for all b0ih0 2 [bih0; bih0 + "]: Since pi;h0 ;ei(:) is continuous (by the
continuity of the ti's), such an " exists.
Now, for any given b¡i; e¡i; let b¤ be the
P
ei¡h0 highest bid submitted by players other
than i: Consider raising i's h0th bid continuously from bih0 to bih0+": As long as the allocation
is unchanging (i.e., except at b¤; if b¤ should happen to be in [bih0; bih0 + "]), this is irrelevant
if i is currently a net buyer (is receiving ei or more objects, and either irrelevant or helpful if
i is currently a net seller (receiving strictly less than ei objects), in each case using A7. So,
consider what happens as goes from just below b¤ to b¤, or from b¤ to just above b¤: In each
case, either the allocation is unchanged (if tie-breaking at b¤ happens to be fortuitous), or
i's allocation goes up by one unit (that is, he sells one less object). But, vi;h0 > pi;h0;ei(b¤) by
choice of ": Hence, such a change will strictly improve i's payo®. And, for b¤ 2 (bih0 ; bih0 + ")
such a change in allocation must occur. It follows that the original bid vector b is weakly
dominated by b0 de¯ned in this way.
But, notice that if one chooses any (e0i; v0i; b0i) su±ciently close to (ei; vi; bi) ; it will remain
the case that pihe0i(b
0
ih) < v 0ih and so (ei; vi; bi) =2 W 0i (note that e0i must equal ei for close by
(e0i; v0i; b0i)). Hence, there is a ball around (ei; vi; bi) with empty intersection with W 0i ; and
(ei; vi; bi) =2 Wi. The proof for h > ei is the same.
41
The following Lemmas are useful in the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 and Theorem 5.
Fix a pro l¯e of strategies (m01; : : : ;m0n) (equilibrium or otherwise). Given these strategies,
let B be the induced measure over B ££. Let Bi be the marginal of B on Bi££i for i 2 N
and let B0 be simply P0, the marginal onto e0.
Our next lemma shows that an implication of the absolute continuity of P with respect toQn
i=0 Pi (A3) is that B is absolutely continuous with respect to
Qn
i=0Bi: So, events involving
the set of submitted bids and realized values that are zero probability assuming players
draw values and bid independently are also zero probability under the actual distribution
over realized values and submitted bids. If in addition,
Qn
i=0 Pi is absolutely continuous
with respect to P (A11) then the reverse implication will be true as well, so that positive
probability events under Qni=0Bi are positive probability under B.
Lemma 6
(1) Under A2-A4, for each strategy pro¯le m0, B is absolutely continuous with respect toQn
i=0Bi:
(2) If A11 is also satis¯ed, then
Qn
i=0Bi is absolutely continuous with respect to Bi:
Proof of Lemma 6. In what follows, think of player 0 as having a singleton strategy space
(¯xed at b0), so that dm0(b0; µ0) = dP0(µ0). Consider any Borel E ½ B £ £
B(E) =
Z
E
" nY
i=0
dmi(bijµi)
#
dP (µ)
=
Z
E
f(µ)
" nY
i=0
dmi(bijµi)dPi(µi)
#
=
Z
E
f (µ)
nY
i=0
dmi(bi; µi)
=
Z
E
f (µ)dm:
Given that f(µ) < M (A2 and A3), it follows thatB(E) <Mm(E). Sincemi = Bi,43 we have
established B(E) < M QiBi(E) and hence Part (1). Assume further that 0 < M0 < f(µ)
(under A11) so that B(E) > M 0m(E). This implies that B(E) > M 0Qi Bi(E) establishing
Part (2).
43B is de¯ned by dB(b; µ) =
Q
i dmi(bi jµi)dP (µ). The careful reader can verify that the marginal of B on
i, Bi, has the same form as one would arrive at by directly taking the marginal of P onto Pi which leads to
dmi(bijµi)dPi(µi) (which for a distributional strategy is the same as dmi(bi; µi)).
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A useful implication of Lemma 6 is that information about the bids or values of some
of the players only changes the probabilities of events involving other players by a factor of
between M and M0:
Lemma 7 Under A2-A4 and A11, if J and J 0 are disjoint subsets of players, and EJ is a
positive probability event involving only the bids or values of players in J; and similarly for
EJ0, then
M Pr(EJ) ¸ Pr(EJ jEJ0 ) ¸ M 0Pr(EJ):
Proof of Lemma 7. To see the second inequality (the ¯rst is analogous), note that
Pr(EJ jEJ0) = Pr(EJ \ EJ0 )Pr(EJ0)
¸ M 0Pr(EJ) Pr(EJ 0)Pr(EJ0)
= M 0Pr(EJ);
where the inequality follows from the proof of Lemma 6.
Say that b 2 [b;¹b]; is a bid-atom for Bi if Bi(fbih = b for some hg) > 0. For each i; letbBi be the set of bid-atoms of Bi:
Recall that our de¯nition of a tie was constructed to rule out irrelevant cases in which
a small change in bid does not a®ect the allocation. Say that bih and bjh0 are in a pre-tie if
bih = bjh0: Let Yi ´ Sj 6=i ³ bBj´ : By avoiding bi 2 Yi; i avoids pre-ties with any given j 6= i,
and so the probability that he is involved in a pre-tie (and hence a tie) is 0. This is stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Under A2 to A4, Pr(fbih = bjh0g \ fbih =2 Yig) = 0: That is, there is zero proba-
bility of a pre-tie involving i when i does not use bids in Yi:
Proof of Lemma 8 This is obvious if the Bi are independent. The result follows by absolute
continuity of B with respect to Qni=1Bi (Lemma 6 part (1)).
Proof of Lemma 2:
Choose a sequence X = fx1; x2; : : :g which is dense on [b; ¹b]; but which avoids Yi. Since
Yi is countable, this can be done. For any " > 0; de¯ne the mapping Ã"i : £i £Bi ! £i £Bi
as follows.
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If vih > pihei(bih), let Ã"i (ei; vi; bi) = (ei; vi; b0i) where b0ih is the lowest indexed element of
X such that bih · b0ih · bih+"; and such that b0ih is below the next discretely higher bid than
bih.44 If vih · pihei(bih), let Ã"i (ei; vi; bi) = (ei; vi; b0i) where b0ih is the lowest indexed element
of X such that bih ¸ b0ih ¸ bih ¡ "; and such that b0ih is above the next discretely lower bid
than bih. Since X is dense, such elements exist (and by Zorn's lemma b0ih is unique).
So, Ã"i slightly raises bids where value is above the marginal transfer, and slightly lowers
bids where value is at or below the marginal transfer in such a way as to miss elements of
Yi:
Note that the resulting bid vector is still an element of Bi: To see this, note that for
any h0 > h; if bih > bih0 then by construction, bih > b0ih: If bih = bih0; then, since pihei(x)
is non-decreasing in h; and since vih is non-increasing, it cannot simultaneously be the case
that vih · pihei(bih) and vih0 > pih0ei(bih0): Hence, the algorithm will never specify lowering
bih but raising bih0: And, if it speci¯es the same direction of movement, it will also specify the
same outcome, so that again there will be no non-monotonicity of the resultant bid vector.
Next, let us check that Ã"i is measurable. To see this, ¯x i and h, and for each j 2
f1; 2; 3; : : :g; let Rj be the set of (ei; vi; b) such that either vih > pihei(bih), bih · xj · bih+ ";
and xj is below the next discretely di®erent bid than bih or vih · pihei(bih), bih ¸ xj ¸ bih¡";
and xj is above the next discretely di®erent bid than bih. Rj is the ¯nite union of the ¯nite
intersection of measurable sets, and so is measurable.
But, in fact, Ã¡1(xj) = Rjn [j0<j Rj; and so is itself measurable. As X is countable, and
as the image of Ã is contained in X; the result follows.45
Hence, mi ± Ã"i is a well de¯ned distributional strategy. By construction, under mi ± Ã"i ;
player i is involved in pre-ties with probability zero, and mi ± Ã"i can be made arbitrarily
close to mi.
The proof is completed by noting that when mi ± Ã"i buys or sells additional objects
compared to mi; it does so at prices which are at worst a little unfavorable. More formally,
consider any (ei; vi; bi; e¡i; b¡i) and the b0 generated by Ã"i : Let ai be the allocation i received
with b (given whatever randomizations the auctioneer performed), and a0i be the allocation
under b0: Note that with probability one, (ei; vi; b0i; e¡i; b¡i) is such that i is not involved in
any ties given b0; so here randomizations are irrelevant. Now, if a0 = a; then i's payo®s have
changed by at most z"; where z is the maximum slope of ti for any given endowment and
44It is useful to note here that raising a buy bid indicates a greater desire to buy, while raising a sell bid
indicates a lower willingness to sell. In each case, since vih > pihei(bihei); this is the direction of the player's
incentives if he is on the margin between being allocated or not allocated an object h:
45Note that we have only sorted out those (ei; vi; bi) such that b0i has h
th element x: It is of course trivial
from to sort out which (ei ; vi; bi) get mapped into any given ` vector from X:
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allocation. Assume a0 > a: Then, for each h 2 (a + 1; : : : a0) ; it must be that vi > pihei(bih):
This is actually not completely obvious, as one way in which the player might have picked up
an extra object is that one of his other bids was relevant to whatever odd tie-breaking rule
the auctioneer might have been using. But, in the event that vi · pihei(bih); b0ih is strictly
lower than bih: So, since i was not allocated an object h before (implying that bih was at
best in a tie), then he would certainly will not be allocated an object h now. Note next that
it must have been the case that each bih, h 2 (a+ 1; : : : a0) was within " of being involved
in a tie (since it was consistent not to allocate these objects to i before, but it is consistent
now). Hence, the increase in i's payment, given moving from allocation a to a0 is at mostX
h2(a+1;:::a0)
(pihei(bih) + 2z") · 2z`" +
X
h2(a+1;:::a0)
pihei(bih))
· 2z`" + X
h2(a+1;:::a0)
vih:
Hence, the di®erence between the increase in payments and the value of the extra objects
allocated is at most 2z`":
Proof of Lemma 3: Fix an arbitrary player i: Let
boi(e; b; v)[h] ´ X`
ai=h
o0(e; b; v)[ai]
be the probability that i ends up with h or more objects given (e; b; v). Let Ti be the event
that i is involved in a tie given equilibrium play. Let T buyih be the subset of Ti such that bih is
a buy o®er involved in a tie and boi(e;v; b)[h] < 1. So, T buyih is the set of events where i's hth
bid is involved in a tie and i does not get an hth object for sure, given at least one of bih > 0;
vih > 0. Suppose that Pr(T buyih ) > 0 under m0. By Lemma 8, Pr(bih 2 YijT buyih ) = 1. By
Lemma 1, Pr(vih < pihei (bih) jT buyih ) = 0: By atomlessness (A4), Pr(vih 2 pihei (Yi) jT buyih ) = 0.
It follows that Pr(vih > pihei (bih) jT buyih ) = 1:
Similarly, let T sellih be the subset of Ti such that i's hth bid is a sell o®er involved in a tie andboi(e; b; v)[h] > 0: Recalling that in our set up, a sale occurs when one's bid is not accepted,
this is the set of events where i's hth bid is involved in a tie, and i does not sell object h for
sure. By an argument analogous to that establishing that Pr(vih > pihei (bih) jT buyih ) = 1, it
follows that Pr(vih < pihei (bih) jT sellih ) = 1:
De¯ne
! ´ X
fhjPr(Tsellih )>0g
Pr(T sellih )E(boi(e; b; v)[h] (pihei (bih)¡ vih) jT sellih )
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+
X
fhjPr(Tbuyih )>0g
Pr(T buyih )E((1 ¡ boi(e; b; v)[h]) (vih ¡ pihei (bih)) jT buyih ):
So, the ¯rst term sums the probabilities of not making a sale on unit h; multiplied by the
minimum expected pro¯t on that sale (under A7), and the second sum does the same thing
for purchases. If Pr(T sellih ) or Pr(T
buy
ih ) is positive for any i; h; then ! is positive.
Suppose ! > 0: Consider changing mi to m ± Ã"i , for " small. It gains at least ! by
transforming boi(e; b; v)[h] to 0 (which, recall, means that i sells his hth object for sure) when
a sell bid bih would have been involved in a tie, and boi(e; b; v)[h] to 1 when a buy bid bih
would have been involved in a tie. And, as argued above, it does almost as well as mi in
terms of the trading price on objects which would have traded anyway, and on any new
trades created beyond those from converting what were originally ties. So, this deviation is
strictly pro¯table for " su±ciently small.
The proof of Lemma 4 uses the following lemma.
Let ci(ei; vi; bi) be the distance between (ei; vi; bi) and Wi: ci is of course continuous.
De¯ne Ci(mi) as the expectation of ci(:) given mi:
Lemma 9 Let o and m be arbitrary. For each i; and for each " > 0; there is a strategy m¤i
such that C(m¤i ) < " and such that ¼(m¤i ;m¡i; o) ¸ ¼(m; o) ¡ ":
Proof of Lemma 9: First replace mi by m0i as given by Lemma 2 such that m0i is
tie-free for i; and such that ¼i(m0i;m¡i; o) ¸ ¼i(mi;m¡i; o)¡ "=2: Consider !i±m0i as given in
A10. Under oS (standard tie-breaking) this does weakly better, so that ¼i(!i±m0i;m¡i; oS) ¸
¼i(m0i;m¡i; oS): And, of course, Ci(m0i) = 0: Now, conceivably, !i(m0i) is not tie-free. Once
again using Lemma 2, let m¤i be a tie free strategy for i close enough to !i(m0i); such that
¼i(m¤i ;m¡i; oS) ¸ ¼i(!i(m0i);m¡i; oS)¡ "=2; and such that Ci(m¤i ) · ": Then,
¼i(m¤i ;m¡i; o) = ¼i(m
¤
i ;m¡i; oS)
¸ ¼i(!i(m0i);m¡i; oS) ¡ "=2
¸ ¼i(m0i;m¡i; oS) ¡ "=2
= ¼i(m0i;m¡i; o) ¡ "=2
¸ ¼i(mi;m¡i; o) ¡ ":
Proof of Lemma 4: First, let us argue that m must have support inWi for all i. Suppose
not, so that for some bidder i; mi puts positive weight outside Wi: But, using Lemma 9,
46
there is m¤i such that C(m¤i ) < C(mi)=3 and such that ¼(m¤i ;m¡i; o) ¸ ¼(m; o)¡ C(mi)=3;
and so m¤i does strictly better in G than mi:
Second, let us argue that m is in fact an equilibrium of the original game. Assume
not, so that for some i; there is m0i such that ¼i(m0i;m¡i; o) > ", for some " > 0: Then,
applying Lemma 9 once again, note that there is m¤i such that C(m¤i ) < "=3 and such
that ¼(m¤i ;m¡i; o) ¸ ¼(m; o) ¡ "=3: But then, m¤i also does strictly better in G than mi; a
contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1: First, let us argue that there exists a monotone pure strategy
equilibrium for a modi¯ed version of the auction. Modify our auction as follows. Add a small
probability that the seller's (player 0's) endowment takes on any value between 0 and n`;
that he sets a zero reserve price, and that there is additional bidder who enters the auction
and randomly makes 2n` bids with an atomless full support on admissible bids. Trivial
extensions of Theorems 3 and 4 admit this modi¯cation. Thus, there exists an undominated¤
equilibrium of the modi¯ed game which does not involve any competitive ties and remains
an equilibrium under any omniscient and e®ectively trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule.
Consider an arbitrary agent i, and let us argue that agent i's strategy must be monotone
and pure.
We start with the following claim.
Claim 1 Let v0i and vi be such that v0ih > vih for all h, and b0i be a best response for v0i; and
bi a best response for vi: Then b0i ¸ bi:
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose to the contrary that b0ih < bih for at least one h. We will argue
that this leads to a contradiction.
By Theorem 4, we know that the equilibrium is still an equilibrium if we choose a tie-
breaking rule such that i loses any competitive ties. So, let us assume that this is the
tie-breaking rule.
Next, due to the added uncertainty of the aggregate endowment and the presence of the
extra bidder, we know that any change of bih leads to a change in the probability of winning
an hth object. Under the tie-breaking rule where i loses all competitive ties, a change in bih,
leaving i's other bids unchanged, does not change the probability that i wins at least h¡ 1
objects, or at least h +1 objects. Thus, under (A80), we can write i's expected payo® given
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(ei; vi; bi) in the following way:46ÃX
h
vihPih(bih)
!
¡ E [Ti(e; b)jei; bi] ;
where Pih(bih) is the probability of winning at least h objects given i's hth bid.
Choose a contiguous set of indexesH = fhL; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; hHg such that b0ih < bih for h 2 H; while
b0ih ¸ bih for h 2 fhL¡ 1; hH +1g the two bids immediately to either side of H (except if H
contains either 0 or `): Then, note that d0i, de¯ned by starting from b0i and raising bids in H
to bih is a valid bid vector, because b0ihL¡1 ¸ bihL¡1: Similarly, di; de¯ned by starting from bi
and lowering bids in H to b0ih is a valid bid vector, because b0ihH+1 ¸ bihH+1:
Since bi is a best response at vi;X
h
vihPih(bih) ¡ E (Ti(e; b¡i; bi)) ¸ X
h
vihPih(dih) ¡ E (Ti(e; b¡i; di)) :
And, since only bids in H have changed, and since the tie breaking rule has i always lose
competitive ties, it follows that
X
h2H
vih (Pih(bih)¡ Pih(dih)) ¸ E (Ti(e; b¡i; bi) ¡ Ti(e; b¡i; di))
and so, since dih = b0ih on HX
h2H
vih (Pih(bih) ¡ Pih(b0ih)) ¸ E (Ti(e; b¡i; bi) ¡ Ti(e; b¡i; di)) (2)
Similarly, since b0i is a best response at v0iX
h
v0ihPih(b
0
ih) ¡ E (Ti(e; b¡i; b0i)) ¸
X
h
vihPih(d0ih)¡ E (Ti(e; b¡i; d0i))
and so X
h2H
v0ih (Pih(b
0
ih)¡ Pih(d0ih)) ¸ E (Ti(e; b¡i; b0i) ¡ Ti(e; b¡i; d0i))
from which X
h2H
v0ih (Pih(b
0
ih) ¡ Pih(bih)) ¸ E (Ti(e; b¡i; b0i) ¡ Ti(e; b¡i; d0i)) (3)
46Note that Ti may not be de¯ned in situations where i is involved in a competitive tie. However, given the
tie-breaking rule such that i always loses competitive ties and the continuity of the ti 's, we can easily extend
Ti to be de¯ned at the (measure 0) set of points where i is involved in a competitive tie by approximating
with bids from \below".
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Adding 3 to 2, one obtains
X
h2H
(vih ¡ v0ih) (Pih(bih)¡ Pih(b0ih)) (4)
¸ E (Ti(e; b¡i; bi) ¡Ti(e; b¡i; di)) ¡ E(Ti(e; b¡i; d0i)¡ Ti(e; b¡i; b0i))
Now, since vih < v0ih for all h; and since bih > b0ih for all h 2 H; and since, given the
perturbation, any change in bid sometimes matters, the LHS of this expression is strictly
negative. However, by (A80), the RHS of this expression is 0.47 This is a contradiction, and
so our supposition was incorrect.
Now let us complete the proof of the corollary. By Claim 1, along any line in agent i's
valuation space that passes through one valuation vector and another vector that is strictly
higher in each dimension, the best response correspondence is increasing the strong sense
that the smallest best response at v 0 > v is at least as large as the largest best response at v.
Thus, along any such line, there are at most a countable number of points at which the best
response correspondence is multi-valued. This implies that the set of valuation vectors where
the best response correspondence is multi-valued is of `-dimensional Lebesgue measure 0.
To see this, denote the set of such valuation vectors by A. By Fubini's Theorem, write the
`-dimensional Lebesgue measure of A asZ
¢ ¢ ¢
Z
IA(vi1; vi2; : : : ; vi`)dvi1 ¢ ¢ ¢ dvi`
where IA is the indicator function. Without loss of generality for assessing the measure of
A, we can assume that it is any line where we vary only vi1 that intersects A in at most a
countable number of points.48 This implies thatZ
IA(vi1; vi2; : : : ; vi` )dvi1 = 0
47Note that while (A80) only applies to a change in a single bid at a time, we can write the RHS of (2)
as a sum of changes of a single bid at a time iterating over the bids in H (here from highest indexed to
lowest), and similarly we can write the RHS of (3) as a sum of changes that involve only a single bid in H
at a time (here from lowest indexed to highest). Each h-th bid where h 2 H changes exactly once in the
corresponding sum in both cases, and so we can then apply (A80).
48For the purpose of determining whether A has positive Lebesgue measure, we can simply rotate the set
itself - so that lines that passed through it on a \45 degree" are now vertical in the vi1 dimension. We omit
a change of notation where A is replaced by its rotation A0. Alternatively, one can do a change of variables,
and reach the same conclusion.
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for all (¢; vi2; : : : ; vi`). It follows thatZ
¢ ¢ ¢
Z
IA(vi1; vi2; : : : ; vi` )dvi1 ¢ ¢ ¢ dvi` = 0:
Since the distribution of types is absolutely continuous with respect to `-dimensional Lebesgue
measure, this implies that the measure of types for which i's best response is multi-valued is
0. Hence, by Claim 1, it follows that the equilibrium must be in monotone pure strategies.49
Finally, let us now take the limit as the extra noise vanishes (along a subsequence if
necessary). By Theorem 2 in JSSZ, we obtain a monotone pure strategy undominated¤
equilibrium of the limit game; but possibly with a strange tie-breaking rule.50 However,
from Theorem 4 we know that the equilibrium must not involve any competitive ties and
remains an equilibrium under any omniscient and e®ectively trade-maximizing tie-breaking
rule, including standard tie-breaking.
Proof of Theorem 5
Fix an auction A = (P; o; t; b0) satisfying A1-A13. For x 2 f3; 4; : : :g; consider an auction
Axmodi¯ed from A as follows: With probability 1=x a non-strategic player n+1 has en+1 = 1
and submits a sell o®er which is uniform on [w;w]:With probability 1=x; en+1 = 0 and n+1
submits a buy o®er which is uniform on [w;w]:With residual probability, player n+1 is not
involved. These events are independent of the events under P .
It is a trivial extension of Theorem 3 that each Ax has an undominated¤ equilibrium mx.
We show that there is ½ > 0 independent of x such that Pr (f trade under mxg) > ½ for
all x: By JSSZ Theorem 2 (which shows upper hemi-continuity of augmented equilibrium
strategies and allocations as the parameters of the game change), any accumulation point
of fmxg is an (augmented) equilibrium of A that puts probability one on the closure of the
set of undominated strategies in which the probability of trade is at least ½. By Theorem
3, this is a standard equilibrium, and so we are done. (A proof of this step via Reny is also
possible.)
So, assume that there is no such ½: Then, there exists a subsequence of x such that the
probability of trade under the corresponding mx goes to 0 along the subsequence. With a
renaming, we can assume that trade goes to 0 along the original sequence.
49Given that we are dealing with distributional strategies, this is up to sets of measure 0, which is in
accordance with our de¯nition of monotone pure strategies. One can change the strategies on the sets of
measure 0, if one likes.
50Note that the set of pure monotone strategies is compact, and that when one takes limits of strategies
and outcomes, the limit tie-breaking rule may di®er from those on the sequence, but will be an omniscient
one with which.
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For notational convenience, let Prx(E) be the probability of event E happening in auction
x under mx. When the probability of an event does not depend on x; we write simply Pr(E)
Consider the case that condition (1) of A12 is satis¯ed. (The argument for the other
condition (2) is analogous.) Let H be the set of buyers for whom the max of the support
over buy values is w: Then, by atomlessness, there is ! > 0 such that for each i 2 H; there
is a probability of at least ! that there are at least `+1 sell values below w¡! among Nni;
and such that for each i =2 H; i never has a buy value above w ¡ !:
Consider an arbitrary k 2 f3; 4; : : :g; and let ± < !=k: For i = 1; : : : ; n + 1; let QxBi be
the number of buy bids above w ¡ 2± that i makes. So,
fQxBi > 0g = fei < `; bi;ei+1 > w ¡ 2±g :
For each x; let
¹x = max
i2H Prx fQ
x
Bi > 0g
be the maximum probability that any player (other than n + 1) makes a buy bid above
w ¡ 2± in Ax (by A13, the fact that mx is undominated¤ and choice of !; Prx (QxBi > 0) = 0
for each player in NnH). Let ix be an associated maximizer of ¹x.
Let QxB =
Pn+1
i=1 QxBi be the random variable giving the number of buy bids above w ¡ 2±
under mx by any player (including player n + 1): Let QxS be the number of sell bids at or
below w ¡ 2± by anyone other than ix (but including player n + 1)
Let us ¯rst argue that Prx (QxB > 0) ! 0 must hold. To see this, suppose to the contrary
that everywhere along a subsequence, Prx (QxB > 0) > °; for some ° > 0: Let j; j0 be any two
players who sometimes have a sell value below w ¡! (two such players exist, since there are
sometimes at least `+1 sell values below w¡!): Then, along a subsequence, at least one of
the players, say player j; assesses probability at least °=2 that one of his opponents makes
a buy bid above w ¡ 2± for each x: By Lemma 7, j thus assigns probability at least M 0°=2
of such a bid conditional on j having a sell value below w ¡ !. Consider the strategy for j
that whenever he has a sell value below w¡!, he bids w¡ 2± on that unit, and that he sets
all other bids equal to value (thus guaranteeing a non-negative pro¯t on those units). Let ¿j
be the probability of such a value for j:
Consider ¯rst the case where j wins at least half the time when he bids w ¡ 2± and one
of his opponents makes a buy bid above w¡ 2±: Then, by A13, his utility from this strategy
is at least
¿j
2
U (! ¡ 2±)M 0°=2:
But, as the utility of selling is bounded by U(w) ¡ U(w) (since w is the most one will ever
receive, and the value of the unit sold is at least w); this implies that in equilibrium, j is
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selling with probability bounded away from zero, contradicting that trade goes to zero along
the sequence.
Consider next the case where j wins less than half the time when he bids w ¡ 2± and
one of his opponents makes a buy bid above w ¡ 2±: This can only happen if at least half
the time that this occurs, there is another player making a sell bid below w ¡ 2±: But in
this event, even under j's equilibrium strategy, at least one unit will have been transferred.
Hence, trade is occurring at least
¿jM 0°=2
of the time, which again contradicts the fact that the probability of trade is going to zero.
So, we have established that Prx (QxB > 0) ! 0. Prx (QxS > 0) ! 0 must also hold.
Assume not, so that Prx (QxS > 0) > ° > 0 along a subsequence. Choose a subsequence along
which ix is constant. Let Yix be the event that ix has a buy value above w ¡ ±: Since ix 2 H;
Pr(Yix) > 0: Now, since QxS depends only on players other than ix; Prx (QxS > 0jYix) >M 0°;
(once again using Lemma 7). So, consider the deviation for ix in which he bids w ¡ 2±
whenever Yix holds, and bids his value otherwise (which under A13 can never result in a
loss). Then, we can argue as before: either ix wins at least half the time that QxS > 0
and Yix are true, in which case his surplus (and hence equilibrium probability of winning)
are bounded away from 0; or ix wins less than half the time, in which case the equilibrium
amount of trade is bounded positive. Either is a contradiction.
Let ¹^x = max
³
¹x; 1x
2±
w¡w
´
> 0 be the maximum over probabilities that any player (in-
cluding player n + 1) makes a buy o®er greater than w ¡ 2±:
Note that Prx (QxB > 0) ¸ ¹^x and hence ¹^x must go to 0. Note also that
Prx (QxB > 0) ·
n+1X
i=1
Prx (QxBi > 0) · n¹^x; (5)
since the second expression errs only in that it over-counts situations where Prx (QxBi > 0)
for more than one i:
The probability that q ¸ 2 players bid at or above w¡ 2± is less than n!q!(n¡q)!M q¡1 (¹^x)q ;
where the factor M q¡1 takes account of the fact that once one knows that one (or more)
players have bid at or above w ¡ 2±; the likelihood of further such players may increase to
M¹x. It follows that
PrxfQxB > `g < Á
³
(¹^x)2 + (¹^x)3 + :::+ (¹^x)n
´
where Á < 1 accounts for both the combinatorial terms and a factor of Mn¡1. Since
PrxfQxB > 0g ¸ ¹^x, and since ¹^x ! 0; it follows from the above inequality that
Prx(QxB · `jQxB > 0) ! 1: (6)
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Choose a subsequence along which ix is constant. Let ³ be the probability that ix has a
buy value above w ¡ 2±: Since ix 2 H; ³ > 0: Consider the deviation dj for any given j 6= ix
that whenever j has a sell value vjh below w ¡ !; and the equilibrium speci¯es a bid bjh
above w ¡ 2±; j submits bjh = w ¡ 2± instead. We show that this is improving for at least
one j 6= ix.
Consider the following set of events, measured relative to the equilibrium strategies. The
E's should be indexed by x, but we omit the notation.
E 01 : QxBix > 0
E 001 : QxB;n+1 > 0; ix has a buy value above ¹w ¡ 2±:
E2 : QxS = 0
E3j : Player j has an unsold unit with value below w ¡ !; even though player j sells
strictly less than QxB objects.
E4 : QxB · `
E5 : There are at least `+ 1 sell values below w ¡! among Nnix:
If ¹^x is maximized by ix; let E1 = E 01: If ¹^x is maximized by n +1; let E1 = E001: Then,
in the ¯rst case, Prx(E1) = ¹^x; while in the second, Prx(E1) = Pr(QB;n+1 > 0) Pr(ix has a
buy value above w ¡ 2±) ¸ ³¹^x; since player n +1 is independent of the rest of the system.
In either case, Prx(E1) ¸ ³¹^x:
Note that under either E 01 or E001 ; ix has a buy value above w ¡ 2±; and hence, since
marginal utility is decreasing and mx is undominated¤, A13 implies that ix has no sell bids
at or below w¡ ±. Under E2; no player other than ix has a sell bid at or below w¡ 2± either.
Thus, under E1 \E2; there is no sell bid of w¡ 2± or lower. So, under E1 \E2 \E3j; j sells
at least one extra object by dj. E4 and E5 are not necessary for j to sell an extra object.
Their role will become clear momentarily.
We claim that Prx(E2jE1) ! 1: To see this in the case of E1 = E01; recall that we have
argued that Prx(E2) ! 1; and hence Prx(:E2) ! 0: But Prx(:E2jE1) · M Prx(:E2) since
E2 involves only players other than ix; while E01 only involves player ix: Hence Prx(:E2jE1) !
0, and so Prx(E2jE1) ! 1: In the case of E 001 ; there is also the information that player n +1
bid at or above w ¡ 2±: This implies that n + 1 did not make any sell bid. Since n + 1 is
independent of the rest of the players, the claim again follows.
Next, note that Prx(E5jE1) ¸ M 0!; since Prx(E5) ¸ !; and since E1 involves only players
ix and n +1; while E5 involves neither of these players.
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Finally, Prx(E4jE1) ! 1 by (6). Combining these, it follows that
Prx(E2 \E4 \E5jE1) ¸ M
0!
2
for x su±ciently large (draw a Venn diagram), and hence
Pr(E1 \E2 \E4 \E5)
¸ M
0!
2
³¹^x:
Thus, dj earns at least ! ¡ 2± with probability at least
Prx(E1 \ E2 \E3j)
¸ Prx(E1 \ E2 \E3j \E4 \E5)
¸ Prx(E3jjE1 \E2 \ E4 \E5)M
0!
2
³¹^x:
On the other hand, lowering the sell bid on object h to w¡ 2± can only result in a worse
outcome for j than the equilibrium strategy when j would already have sold object h, which
occurs with probability bounded by Prx(QxB > 0): From 5, Prx(QxB > 0) · n¹^x: And, since
w was the upper bound on buy values for players, and hence on their bids, these objects
would have sold for at most w; while under dj; they sell for at least w ¡ 2±: So, the cost of
dj in this event is at most `2±. Since the utility function has a bounded derivative, there
exists ¤ < 1 such that U 0(x)=U 0(y) < ¤ for all x and y: So, for the deviation not the be
pro¯table, it must be that
Prx(E3jjE1 \E2 \E4 \E5)M
0!
2
³¹^x (! ¡ 2±) · n¹^x`2±¤
Dividing both sides by ¹^x± (which is valid, because ¹^x is positive thanks to player n+1);
and summing across players other than ix;
M 0!
2
³
µ!
±
¡ 2
¶ X
j 6=ix
Prx(E3jjE1 \ E2 \E4 \E5) · (n¡ 1)n`2¤:
But, in any realization where E1 \E2 \E4 \E5 holds, E3j must hold for at least one j 6= ix;
since there are ` + 1 sell values below w ¡ 2±; since no sell bid is at or below ¹w ¡ 2±; and
since there are at most ` buy o®ers above ¹w ¡ 2± (it is for this purpose that E4 and E5 were
maintained). Integrating across realizations,X
j 6=ix
Prx(E3jjE1 \ E2 \E4 \ E5) ¸ 1;
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and so
M 0!
2
³
µ!
±
¡ 2
¶
· (n¡ 1)n2`±¤:
Recall that k 2 f3; 4; : : :g is arbitrary and that ± was chosen so that !=k > ±. It follows that
M 0!
2
³ (k ¡ 2) · (n¡ 1)n2`!
k
¤:
This equation is clearly false for k su±ciently large, and we have a contradiction.
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